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CONSUMER PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE:
AS THE MILLENNIUM APPROACHED, MINNESOTA




The notion that individuals are entitled to privacy has been
present in legal scholarship,1 statutes, and case law2 for a century.
Brandeis articulated it as "the right to be let alone."' Supreme
Court justices state as a given that "there is a zone of privacy sur-
rounding every individual, a zone within which the State may
protect him."4 In speaking of a "right" to privacy, the law recog-
nizes a deep human need,5 and acknowledges that the expecta-
tion of privacy has been accepted as part of the mores of our
society. That expectation carries over into various aspects of life,
* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author
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tion, the author thanks Georgia State University College of Law for its financial
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1. See, e.g., Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928). See also
Robert Gellman, Does Privacy Work?, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY. THE NEW
LANDSCAPE 193, 195-202 (1998) (discussing tort law theories to recover from
invasions of privacy).
3. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The makers of
the Constitution] sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions, and their sensations. They conferred, as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men.").
4. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487 (1975). The quoted lan-
guage refers to the State protecting the individual from "intrusion by the press."
See also Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 120 S. Ct.
483 (1999) (upholding a California statute which restricted the public's access
to arrested persons' names and addresses). The state's justification for the stat-
ute was that it protected the privacy of victims and those arrested. See id. at 492
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
5. See Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for
Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REv. 1033, 1053 (noting Alan Wes-
tin's theory that a person's desire for privacy may be biological).
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and many surveys6 have shown that consumers' expectation of
privacy encompasses their transactions with businesses.
Nevertheless, there is no generally accepted definition of
privacy. Whereas the "right to be let alone" focuses on the indi-
vidual, others prefer a definition which views privacy in the con-
text of society. 7 Those focusing on the individual characterize
invasion of privacy as "an offense to your dignity."8 They point to
people's concerns about personal safety and identity theft.'
Those preferring a definition that takes into consideration the
context in which privacy invasions occur emphasize the power of
government and its many sources of information about its citi-
zens1° and the insatiable appetite of business for collecting,
using, and sharing data about consumers."1 In addition, there is
a debate among legal scholars over whether privacy should be
protected by liability rules or by treating privacy as a commodity
to which a person has a property right subject to negotiation with
parties who want an interest in that property.12
The ability of government and business to collect, store, ana-
lyze, retrieve, and transmit personal information has been greatly
enhanced by advances in computer technology. 3 One of the fea-
tures of much of this technology is its ability to "search without
disturbing."14 A persons' privacy is invaded, and they do not
have any idea it is happening. Professor Lessig has identified sev-
eral significant effects which he asserts have resulted from the
increased capacity to collect, store, retrieve, and transmit per-
6. See PETER P. SwIRE & ROBERT E. LrrAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD
DATA FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DrRECTIVE 80
(1998); Mark E. Budnitz, Privacy Protection for Consumer Transactions in Electronic
Commerce: Why Self-Regulation is Inadequate, 49 S.C. L. REv. 847, 849 (1998);
Sovern, supra note 5, at 1056-64.
7. See Gellman, supra note 2, at 193.
8. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 147 (1999).
See also Sovern, supra note 5, at 1053-54.
9. See Sovern, supra note 5, at 1054.
10. See SWIRE & LITAN, supra note 6, at 6; Jerry Berman & Deirdre Mulli-
gan, Privacy in the Digital Age: Work in Progress, 23 NOVA L. REV. 551, 560-61
(1999). An example of a legislative response to this concern is the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1999), which establishes rules for the collection, use and dis-
closure of personal information held by federal agencies, with a special focus
on using computers to invade privacy. See also Gellman, supra note 2, at 195-97.
11. See Sovern, supra note 5, at 1034-36. An example of a legislative
response to this concern is the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-
1681t (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
12. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 160-61.
13. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 554-56.
14. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 149.
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sonal information. People have lost the "benefit of innocence."1
Formerly, it was comparatively easy to live anonymously. How-
ever, now the burden is on the individual to prove that, despite
the questions raised by putting certain facts about the individual
in a particular context, the true story is different from what
appears from viewing the data in that context. As the ability to
monitor our behavior increases, there will be a decrease in the
diversity of values held by our citizens because those collecting
the data will be better able to impose their values upon US.
16
Based on their ability to create profiles of each consumer, busi-
nesses will be able to discriminate, targeting certain groups of
consumers for some products and prices, and ignoring or offer-
ing other options to consumers with different profiles.17 This
creates the danger of recreating "systems of status"1 8 based on
"social or economic criteria."' 9 This may erode the relative
equality that consumers in a more anonymous society enjoy when
they purchase goods and services.
20
Consumers' ever increasing use of electronic commerce has
heightened concerns over privacy. 21 While consumers shop on
the Web in the seclusion and privacy of their homes, increas-
ingly they realize that companies can easily invade that privacy.
Perhaps the very paradox of losing one's privacy while in a place
which we regard as a refuge from life's involuntary intrusions
increases consumers' anxiety. Incidents involving invasions
which occurred within a few weeks of each other at the turn of
the millennium illustrate that consumers have a legitimate basis
for concerns about privacy. A person calling himself Maxim,
believed to reside in Eastern Europe, stole more than 300,000
15. Id. at 152.
16. See id. at 153.
17. See id. at 153-55. See alsoJennifer L. Alvey, Internet Privacy: Consumer
Fears About Online Privacy, Individual Profiling Threaten E-Commerce, 68 U.S.L.W.
2318 (Nov. 30, 1999).
18. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 155.
19. Id. at 154.
20. See id.
21. See SwIRE & LrrAN, supra note 6, at 80; Sovern, supra note 5, at 1060-
61; Simson L. Garfinkle, Someone is Watching, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 16, 2000,
at D1. Others assert that privacy risks are greatly exaggerated, as a person's
credit card account number is far more likely to be stolen when he or she gives
the card to a waiter. See Lesley Campbell, A New Oracle: Dreams of Visions in the
Future, SUNDAY HERALD, Sept. 19, 1999, at 21, available in 1999 WL 22705346;
Technology-Insurers Insist They're Safe from the Hackers, POST MAG., Sept. 9, 1999, at
13, available in 1999 WL 9020504. These observers ignore incidents such as the
theft of 300,000 credit card account numbers from one company's database by
a hacker who presumably was not a waiter, or who at least did not steal the
information while waiting on tables. See infra text accompanying note 22.
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credit card files from an Internet music seller.2 2 When the seller
refused Maxim's demand for $100,000, he published 25,000 of
the files, containing credit card numbers, names, and addresses,
on a Web site he had set up. Maxim claimed he had found a
security defect in the software that the seller used to protect
financial information. One industry representative downplayed
the significance of the incident because it apparently involved
access to the company's database rather than someone inter-
cepting transactions from the Internet.2' This occurrence illus-
trates the close connection between security and privacy. It also
shows that data is vulnerable not only when it is transmitted
through cyberspace from the consumer's computer to the seller,
but also when it is in the seller's database. While it may be com-
forting to some in the industry that the theft seemingly occurred
from the seller's database, it is unlikely that the distinction
between thefts from cyberspace transmissions and databases will
ease consumer concerns. It certainly did not lessen the fears of
the Connecticut Attorney General who reacted by announcing
he was considering "'measures and incentives"' to ensure better
protection of the personal information which Web sellers col-
lect.2 4 While this article focuses on the legitimate consumer data
practices of businesses, and not on the conduct of thieves and
extortionists, consumers probably add this incident to their gen-
eral mental image of e-commerce as a risky venture rather than
differentiating among different types of privacy invasions.
There were several other occurrences at the turn of the new
century as well. Amazon.com has made it a practice to publish its
privacy policy even though no law required it to do so. Neverthe-
less, in December, 1999, a security expert filed a formal com-
plaint with the FTC, alleging that one of Amazon.com's
subsidiaries collects considerably more personal consumer infor-
mation than its published policy disclosed. 25 The FTC itself took
the initiative in another case in which it accused an online auc-
tion house of unfair or deceptive practices by unlawfully taking a
competitor's list of its customers' e-mail addresses, sending
deceptive spam to persons on that list, and falsely representing
22. See John Markoff, An Online Extortion Plot Results in Release of Credit
Card Data, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2000, at 1.
23. See Mark Harrington, Hacker Sparks E-Tailer Concerns, NEWSDAY, Jan. 11,
2000, at A37.
24. Id.
25. See John Markoff, Bitter Debate on Privacy Divides Two Experts, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 30, 1999, available in 1999 WL 31761916.
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that the competitor authorized the e-mailing. 6 The auction
house obtained the list by registering with its competitor, the
major online auction e-Bay, agreeing to comply with eBay's "User
Agreement and Privacy Policy" which prohibited the auction
house from using eBay's customer list for unauthorized purposes
such as sending spam. The case illustrates that consumers must
be concerned, not only with the use of information by companies
with whom they do business and to whom they provide informa-
tion, but also with the unauthorized actions of others with whom
that business has contact. The case also demonstrates that the
agreements a company imposes on others with whom it shares
information are not always honored. ChoicePoint's contract with
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation was canceled
when it transmitted confidential information from drivers'
records to insurance companies over the Internet, in violation of
its contract with the state.27 This incident illustrates the close
connection between privacy collection and sharing between gov-
ernment and business.28 It is also another example of the viola-
tion of a confidentiality agreement.
DoubleClick uses advertising banners on Web sites to track
persons who visit Web sites, but until January 2000, has known
who the persons are only by way of an anonymous number
assigned to each person.29 Starting in January, the company
began to use technology that enables it to link the person's con-
duct on the Web with the person's name, address, and off-line
shopping history.3" Among the Web sites from which
DoubleClick collects information are Web sites which provide
medical information.31 It has more than 100 million files on visi-
tors to these sites. 32 DoubleClick transfers information about
each person's visit to another location. Therefore, if the visitor
went to a page on the site which provided information about dia-
betes, that would be included in the company's database on that
person. Information provided by the visitor in health evaluations
26. Online Auction Site Settles FTC Privacy Charges, (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.ftc.opa/2000/01/reverse4.htm> (the online auction firm agreed
to settle the case).
27. See Editorial, ChoicePoint Loses Contract Over Privacy, ATtLkNTAJ.-CONST.,
Jan. 7, 2000, at F2.
28. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 872-74.
29. See Ryan Tate, DoubleClick Damage Control, UPSIDE TODAY, Feb. 2, 2000,
available in 2000 Wesdaw 4724326; Editorial, Double Privacy Trouble, USA TODAY,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 16A [hereinafter Editorial]
30. See Editorial, supra note 29.
31. See John Schwartz, Medical Web Sites Faulted on Privacy, WASHINGTON
POST, Feb. 1, 2000, at El.
32. See id.
2000]
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provided by the sites also is collected. Reaction was swift. The
Center for Democracy and Technology urged people to bom-
bard DoubleClick with e-mail complaints,"3 and an individual
filed a lawsuit alleging that DoubleClick had obtained and sold
personal information unlawfully.3 4 The lawsuit requested an
injunction to stop the company from continuing to collect infor-
mation until it obtained explicit permission from visitors to the
affected sites.
Finally, First Union bank announced it was suing a company
engaged in "screen scraping."35 Screen scrapers are companies
that obtain a consumer's authorization to take information from
another company's site for the purpose of consolidating the
information all in one place so consumers can have all their
account information at various banks on one site and can pay
their bills through that site. First Union claimed the screen
scraper was acting without the bank's consent and not adequately
safeguarding consumer information. This lawsuit illustrates that
when considering the privacy of financial information held by
banks about consumers, it is necessary to look well beyond the
banks themselves in order to have a complete picture of whether
the data is truly protected.
The increased importance of consumers engaging in e-com-
merce and their privacy concerns have led to consideration of
legislation that would protect consumers whether they shop on-
line or off-line. This article explores important developments in
consumer privacy which occurred during 1999 with an emphasis
on e-commerce. As will be seen, however, it is impossible to limit
the consideration to e-commerce, for the developments in e-
commerce have had a major impact on traditional commerce as
well. These developments illustrate the powerful influence of
consumers' belief, not only that they have a right to be "let
alone," but also that, once they share personal information with a
company, they should retain some degree of control over that
information.36 The events of 1999 also illustrate that "privacy
33. See Tate, supra note 29. See also Center for Democracy and Technol-
ogy, DoubleClick Has Double-Crossed the Net (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://
www.cdt.org/action/doubleclick.shtml>.
34. See New Media, COMMUNICATIONS DALY, Jan. 31, 2000, available in 2000
WL 4694404.
35. Carol Power, First Union Confirms It is Suing a "Screen Scraper", AM.
BANKER, Jan. 19, 2000, at 5.
36. See Berman & Mulligan, supra note 10, at 556 n.11.
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issues are fundamentally matters of values, interests, and
power.
37
Privacy for consumers on the Internet has become an issue
of increasing importance as electronic commerce has shown the
promise of profitability. Until 1999, government primarily
assumed a passive role, issuing reports, warning business they
were monitoring e-commerce's activities, but insisting that at this
early stage of development, the best course was for industry to
operate free of government interference. In 1999, that began to
change. This article focuses on three developments which illus-
trate various aspects of government involvement. First, the arti-
cle examines a lawsuit brought by the Attorney General of
Minnesota against US Bank. The lawsuit alleged, in part, that the
bank violated the state's Consumer Fraud Act by promising con-
sumers on its Web site that their personal information would be
kept confidential, while selling that information to a third party
marketer. Second, the article reviews actions and pronounce-
ments in 1999 of two regulatory agencies, which edged closer to
taking concrete action on privacy, while remaining ambivalent.
Third, the article analyzes legislation containing significant con-
sumer privacy protection which Congress passed in 1999 and
compares it with other bills pending in Congress. This inquiry
yields insights into some of the essential issues in making con-
sumer privacy policy, and suggests the need for additional legisla-
tion to protect consumers while allowing business to flourish in a
robust e-commerce environment.
Government regulators have been urging banks and other
industries to post privacy policies on their Web sites, but have not
provided guidance on what those policies should be. US Bank
followed the regulators' advice, posted a policy, and made it a
strong policy purporting to keep all consumer information confi-
dential, whatever the source. The Minnesota Attorney General's
lawsuit illustrates the perils of following this course of action.
The article explores the strength of the Attorney General's case
under the state's Consumer Fraud Act. Even assuming the bank
violated its posted policy, it is questionable whether the state's
law is adequate to force a company to comply with its posted pol-
icy. The consent agreement is analyzed, revealing a rather nar-
row remedy was achieved. Finally, the systemic limits of litigation
are described. In light of the above, the article examines the
need for legislation.
37. Gellman, supra note 2, at 195 (referring to remarks made by Alan
Westin).
2000]
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Federal agencies have issued several pronouncements, epis-
tles of advice, reports, and guidelines on privacy, none having
the force of law, but all admonishing businesses to watch their
step. Their pronouncements suggest their ambivalence:
acknowledging there is a significant potential problem which
may well require action by regulatory agencies, but strong reluc-
tance to take any action at this early stage for fear of unduly
restricting a newly emerging medium for engaging in commerce.
In short, they don't want to kill the goose that may be laying the
golden egg, but are not sure how pure the gold in that egg is.
Agency reluctance is understandable, but the result of their vari-
ous statements is a lack of uniformity, consistency, and specificity.
In addition, since none of the statements have the force of law,
businesses lack a legal incentive to seriously examine and
strengthen their privacy policies. It is doubtful that consumer
preferences for privacy and public reactions to scattered media
exposes are sufficient to ensure a satisfactory degree of privacy.
Litigation has a limited reach and regulatory agencies have
refused to act. The Republican-controlled Congress is the last
place many would have thought consumer privacy would find a
sympathetic audience. Nevertheless, not only have several con-
sumer privacy bills been submitted, but privacy played a central
role in Congress' consideration of the legal restructuring of the
entire financial services industry."8 The result is important new
legislation granting consumers a modicum of privacy when deal-
ing with financial institutions. The article examines this
landmark statute, compares it to the approaches taken in other
pending bills and assesses the need for additional legislation to
ensure consumer privacy. The new law and pending bills illus-
trate how difficult it is to identify industry's need and desire to
collect and share information and consumers' need and desire to
have their privacy protected. Even if these are properly identi-
fied, striking the proper balance among the competing interests
presents difficulties as well. Nevertheless, the article recom-
mends legislation to provide greater protection in certain areas.
I. HA TCH V. US BAA-. THE POSSIBILrITES AND LIMITATIONS OF
AGENCY LAWSUITS
A. The Complaint
In June, 1999, Mike Hatch, the Attorney General of Minne-
sota, brought what was apparently the first lawsuit which alleged,
38. See Michael Schroeder, Legislators Reject a Plan to Strengthen the Protec-
tions Involving Consumer Privacy, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 1999, at A50.
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inter alia, that a company had violated the law by violating a pri-
vacy policy which it had posted on its Web site. An examination
of that litigation illustrates many of the potentialities of litigation
brought by a state agency, and also the severe limitations attend-
ant upon such actions.
According to the Complaint,"9 US Bank and its parent hold-
ing company US Bancorp, ("the bank") sold confidential infor-
mation about their customers to MemberWorks. MemberWorks
is a telemarketing company which sells memberships in a dental
and health service.4 ° The bank was paid $4 million plus a com-
mission of 22 percent of net revenue based on MemberWorks'
sales to the bank's customers. From January 1, 1996 to the filing
of the Complaint, the bank provided information on 600,000
checking account customers and 330,000 credit card customers.
Under agreements between the bank and MemberWorks, the
bank provided MemberWorks with seventeen items of personal
information, including social security numbers, account status
and frequency of use, a "behavior score," a "bankruptcy score,"
gender, and marital status.4 1 In its answers to the Attorney Gen-
eral's interrogatories, MemberWorks acknowledged receiving
many of these items. The Complaint notes that some of the
information provided to the telemarketer was based on informa-
tion other than the bank's "first-hand experience with their cus-
tomers. 42 The implication is that the bank may have received at
least some of this information, such as the bankruptcy score and
behavior score, from third parties.
The sharing of information did not end when
MemberWorks received it; MemberWorks in turn passed the
information on to telemarketing vendors whom they hired to
conduct the actual sales calls. The Complaint alleges that
MemberWorks and their vendor representatives used this infor-
mation when making their calls as well as for bulk mailing solici-
tations.4 3 Customers receiving the calls did not know the
telemarketer already had their credit card numbers or checking
account numbers. If the customer asked if the telemarketer had
39. Complaint, Attorney Gen. v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n ND (visited Feb. 2,
2000) <http://ag.state.mn.us/home/files/news/pr-usbank_06091999.html>
[hereinafter "Complaint"].
40. The program offered X-rays and oral exams free or for a nominal
charge, discounts for dental services, and access to a network of participating
dentists. See id. at 45 The Complaint also involves Coverdell & Company, a
subsidiary of MemberWorks. See id. at 14.
41. Id. at 1 15.
42. Id. at 1 19.
43. See id. at 44.
20001
830 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
the customer's account number, the caller was instructed to fol-
low a script in which the customer was told; "No, I personally do
not have your account number.""
Although the Complaint alleges various wrongful practices
and violations of various statutes, of relevance to this article are
the allegations relating to electronic commerce. The bank had
posted the following privacy policy on its Web site:
US Bancorp and its family of financial service providers
understands that confidentiality is important to you and
essential in our business. It is our policy that all personal
information you supply to us will be considered confiden-
tial. This policy holds true no matter how we receive your
personal information; over the phone, at our branches,
through our ATMs or on-line at this Web site. (May 25,
1999).45
The Complaint alleges that the bank "created an expecta-
tion that its Minnesota consumers have a right to financial pri-
vacy." 46 Presumably, this expectation was created by the privacy
policy posted on the Web. Despite this clear and sweeping pri-
vacy statement, credit card customers received notice that their
privacy might not be all that sacred to the bank. The credit card
agreement provided that the bank "share [s] information within
our organization" 47 unless the customer wrote to say he or she
did not want the information shared. In addition, "[p] eriodically
we may share our cardholder lists with companies that supply
products and services that we feel our customers will value ....
You may request that your name and information not be given to
these companies by writing."
48
The Complaint alleges in Count II that the bank violated the
Minnesota Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act and Deceptive
Trade Practices Act (Minnesota Fraud Act). That law provides
that the use of "any fraud, false promise, misrepresentation, mis-
leading statement or deceptvie practice, with intent that others
rely thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise,
whether or not any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or
damaged thereby, is enjoinable as provided herein."49 The Com-
plaint then notes that the privacy statement on the Web site does
not advise consumers that their confidential information will be
44. Id. at 26.
45. Id. at 4.
46. Id. at 39.
47. Id. at 41
48. Id.
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69 (1) (West 1995).
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sold to third parties, nor that they may opt-in or opt-out of the
sale of this information, or how the bank chooses to use the
information. Whereas the credit card agreement provided infor-
mation about affiliate sharing of information, "[b]y titling the
paragraph 'Affiliate Sharing,' consumers are deceived and/or
misled regarding the sale of information to unrelated, non-affili-
ated entities."50
The Complaint does not explicitly allege that all of the alle-
gations in Count II, or in the preceding paragraphs of the Com-
plaint which are incorporated into this count, amount to a
violation of the Act. Rather, the Complaint alleges under this
Count that the bank's "sale of personal, confidential information
obtained from consumers in the course of a banking relationship"51
is a deceptive and misleading act. What is not clear is whether
the Attorney General also would regard the bank's sale of infor-
mation about the consumer obtained from its own investigation
or from third parties would be a deceptive and misleading act.
The paragraph in the Complaint alleging that the sale of
information obtained from consumers is a deceptive and mis-
leading act also alleges that the same conduct violates Minnesota
consumers' common law right to privacy.52 The Complaint cites
Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., in support of this contention.53 The
Complaint then alleges that " [t] he systematic violation of Minne-
sota's common law right of privacy is a violation" of the Minne-
sota Fraud Act.54
In response to the Complaint, the bank denied the allega-
tions that it violated consumer protection and privacy laws.55
The bank admitted it had cooperative marketing agreements
with MemberWorks and other companies. The bank touted its
commitment to consumer privacy. "U.S. Bancorp takes customer
privacy very seriously, and has strict poicies in place to protect
that privacy."56 Furthermore, the bank insisted that "[o]ur part-
ners at no time have access to customer accounts."57 Soon after
the Complaint was filed, U.S. Bancorp announced it was termi-
50. Complaint, supra note 39, at 65
51. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
52. See id.
53. See id. at 68, citing Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W. 2d 231
(Minn. 1998).
54. Complaint, supra note 39, at 74.
55. See U.S. Bancorp News Release, US. Bancorp Denies Minnesota Attorney
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nating contracts with companies that marketed non-financial
products.5 8 Bank of America and Wells Fargo also said they
would end such agreements.
59
B. Critique of the Complaint
An examination of the Complaint illustrates the types of
benefits and disadvantages which litigation poses for both those
using a lawsuit to promote consumer privacy and those busi-
nesses which are accused of violating that privacy where no fed-
eral or state statute specifically governs consumer privacy in
electronic commerce. This examination demonstrates the need
for a statute tailored to consumer electronic commerce which
takes into account the needs of all of the affected parties.
One challenge for those drafting the Complaint for the Min-
nesota Attorney General must have been finding a legal basis for
the allegations that posting a privacy policy on the Web while not
following that policy in practice violated the law. The Complaint
never comes right out and says the bank broke any law by doing
such. Rather, as described above, the Complaint's specific allega-
tion was that the sale of "personal, confidential" information the
bank obtained from consumers "in the course of a banking rela-
tionship ... is a deceptive and misleading act" and violated the
common law right of privacy.60
One can only speculate why the Complaint is framed in this
way, but it is instructive to examine the difficulties posed by
attacking the bank directly for violating a policy posted on its
Web site. The Attorney General might have argued that posting
a policy on the Web and not following it is a breach of the bank's
contract with its customers. This contention, however, would
have required proving that the policy posted on the Web site is
part of the contract between the customer and the bank.
Although the Uniform Commercial Code's Article 2 does not
apply to this case because it did not involve a "transaction in
58. See U.S. Bancorp, A Letter from the Chairman, President and CEO,
Usbancorp (visited June 11, 1999) <http://www.usbank.com/customer-privacy/
61199.html> ("Customer privacy is at the core of our business, and we did not
misuse customer information .... There is nothing we value more than the
trust you put in us. When that trust is called into question, it's something we
take very seriously.").
59. See Tim Huber, U.S. Bancorp, Minnesota Attorney General Settle Customer
Privacy Suit, KNIGHT-RIDDER TRIB. Bus. NEWS, available in 1999 WL 17353777;
Bank of America Announces Privacy Position Concerning Third-Party Marketers, (vis-
ited Apr. 10, 2000) <http://www.bankamerica.com/news/news660.html>.
60. Complaint, supra note 39, at 68.
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goods,"'" the UCC's provisions for sales of goods provides us with
the type of analysis courts typically use. The contract of the par-
ties "means the total legal obligation which results from the par-
ties' agreement as affected by this Act and any other applicable
rules of law."'6 2 "Agreement" means "the bargain of the parties in
fact as found in their language or by implication from other cir-
cumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or
course of performance."6
Whether the privacy policy became part of the contract
between the parties may depend on whether the language in any
written agreement between them contains language incorporat-
ing by reference the practices and policies of the bank. If such
language was present, the Attorney General had a strong argu-
ment that the bank breached its contract.
If there were no such language, the Attorney General would
have to rely on "other circumstances" such as usage of the trade,
course of dealing, and course of performance. Presumably,
nothing in the language of any written agreements between the
bank and its customers referred to or incorporated by reference
the bank's privacy policy as posted on its Web site. "Usage of
trade" means a practice "having such regularity of observance...
as to justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to
the transaction in question."64 Although in the future the post-
ing of privacy policies may come within this definition, in June of
1999, the Attorney General would have had difficulty proving a
usage of trade. A course of dealing refers to previous transac-
tions between the parties which establish a common basis of
understanding.65 A course of performance involves the parties'
performance of the contract which the other party accepts or
acquiesces in." It is doubtful that the posted privacy policy
comes within either of these two possible categories. If the
posted privacy policy is not part of the agreement, then it is not
part of the contract, the bank's legal obligation, unless some
other law makes it so. From the information provided in the
Complaint, it is unclear whether the posted policy became part
of the contract between the bank and the consumer. If it did not
become part of the contract, the bank did not breach any con-
tract with the consumer. On the other hand, if it was not part of
the contract and the policy contained limitations and qualifica-
61. U.C.C. § 2-102.
62. U.C.C. § 1-201 (11).
63. U.C.C. § 1-201(3).
64. U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
65. See U.C.C. § 1-205(1).
66. See U.C.C. § 2-208(1).
20001
834 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
tions of the circumstances under which it would protect the con-
fidentiality of its information about the consumers, the
consumer would not be bound by those restrictions. If the con-
sumer could find a legal basis for arguing the bank's practices
violated her right to privacy, the policy would not constitute a
waiver or limitation of her right.
The Attorney General may have considered alleging com-
mon law misrepresentation. To succeed, however, he would
have had to prove, inter alia, that consumers justifiably relied
upon the misrepresentations in the posted privacy policy.6 7 This
would require the Attorney General to prove three things: that
consumers went to the bank's Web site and read the privacy pol-
icy; that consumers relied on that privacy policy when entering
into transactions with MemberWorks; and that such reliance was
reasonable.
Instead of alleging that the bank breached its contract with
consumers or engaged in common law misrepresentation, the
Attorney General alleged violations of three Minnesota statutes.
Each of these presented its own challenges and illustrate the
need for legislation specifically designed to balance the privacy
needs of consumers against the information sharing needs of
industry. One of these statutes is the Minnesota Consumer
Fraud Act. That law prohibits the employment of "any fraud,
false promise, misrepresentation, misleading statement or decep-
tive trade practice."68 A major advantage of proceeding under
the Minnesota Fraud Act instead of breach of contract or misrep-
resentation is that it does not require the plaintiff to prove that
"any person has in fact been misled, deceived, or damaged
thereby."69 The Attorney General, however, may have faced an
obstacle in fitting the posted privacy policy within the scope of
the statute. The Act applies to any of the above conduct which is
committed "in connection with the sale of any merchandise."70
The statute formerly defined "merchandise" as "any objects,
wares, goods, commodities, intangibles, real estate, loans, or serv-
ices."71 In the Boubelik case, the Minnesota Supreme Court held
that the Act did not apply to bank loans because the statute did
not include such loans in its definition of "merchandise," and
bank loans were not "intangibles" or "services."7" The legislature
67. See Yost v. Millhouse, 373 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
68. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.69(1) (West 1995).
69. Id.; see also Lesage v. Norwest Bank, 409 N.W.2d 536 (Minn. 1987).
70. § 325F.69(1).
71. § 325F.68.
72. Boubelik v. Liberty State Bank, 553 N.W.2d 393, 403 (Minn. 1996).
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responded by amending the statute to include loans.73 Boubelik
adopted a narrow interpretation of the statute which could have
hindered the Attorney General. The court seemed to be saying
that unless a product were specifically listed in the definition of
"merchandise" or could be characterized as a service or intangi-
ble, it was not covered by the statute. Some of the consumers of
U.S. Bank undoubtedly obtained loans from the bank. The
Attorney General could have argued that the privacy policy was
related to their bank loans and consequently the policy was sub-
ject to the Consumer Fraud Act. But it is not clear that the bank
would be subject to the Act in regard to those consumers who
had not taken out bank loans.
Boubelik is not the final word on the meaning of "merchan-
dise" under the Act, however. In the Force case, a federal district
court distinguished Boubelik.74 The court pointed out that the
Boubelik decision rested on the fact that the Act speaks in terms of
the "sale of any merchandise" and a bank extending a loan is not
"selling" money.75 The Force court faced the question of whether
the sale of insurance was covered by the Act. The court relied on
another Minnesota case that found that the sale of investment
contracts is governed by the statute because the definition of
merchandise includes commodities and intangibles.76 The court
found the sale of insurance to be comparable to the sale of
investment contracts. Holding more promise for the Attorney
General, moreover, was the court's reference to a New Jersey
decision in which the court felt free to include transactions not
specifically listed in the statute because remedial statutes such as
these cannot obtain their objectives if persons could evade them
merely by devising new fraudulent schemes which the statute had
failed to mention.77 In litigating against U.S. Bank, the Attorney
General may have found that the court sided with the approach
taken by the Force court. He ran the risk, however, of the court
favoring Boubelik's narrow construction, and granting a motion to
dismiss.
When the recently enacted federal Financial Institutions
Modernization Act of 1999 becomes effective in November,
73. See id. at 403, n. 18.
74. See Force v. ITT Hartford Life & Annuity Ins. Co., 4 F. Supp. 2d 843
(D. Minn. 1998).
75. Id. at 858-59.
76. See id. at 859 (relying on Jenson v. Touche Ross & Co., 335 N.W.2d
720, 726 (Minn. 1983)).
77. See id., (citing Lemelledo v. Beneficial Management Corp., 696 A.2d
546, 551 (N.J. 1997)).
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2000,78 U.S. Bank will have a duty to disclose its privacy policy.
When the Attorney General brought his suit, however, the law
had not yet been enacted, raising the question of whether the
bank had a duty to disclose that it did not keep customer infor-
mation confidential. If it did not have that duty, then arguably, it
did not violate the Consumer Fraud Act by this failure to dis-
close. The Boubelik decision held that a company does not have a
duty to disclose material facts about a transaction unless "special
circumstances" are present.79 Boubelik includes a nonexclusive
list of examples of special circumstances:
One who speaks must say enough to prevent his words
from misleading the other party. One who has special
knowledge of material facts to which the other party does
not have access may have a duty to disclose these facts to
the other party. One who stands in a confidential or fidu-
ciary relation to the other party to a transaction must dis-
close material facts.80
U.S. Bank would seem to fall under the first two examples.
Perhaps it had no duty to disclose anything about its privacy pol-
icy, but once it posted its privacy policy on the Web site, it had a
duty not to mislead. In addition, the bank had "special knowl-
edge" of its privacy policy and practices. Consumers had no
access to information about that policy except for the disclosures
made on the Web site. They had no information about the
bank's practice of selling information to MemberWorks. The
Attorney General may have run into problems, nevertheless,
from court decisions stating that in a case relying on the "special
knowledge" situation, there must be proof that the party with the
special knowledge must know that the other party will rely on his
erroneous beliefs.81
In addition, the Attorney General may have had a problem
proving that the sale of "personal, confidential information"
82
violated the Minnesota Fraud Act. No cases decided under that
statute involved sharing "personal, confidential" information.
Furthermore, it is not clear how that phrase should be inter-
preted. "Personal" information presumably means what is typi-
cally referred to as 'personally identifiable information.' That is
information which relates to an individual, not a person in a rep-
78. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999).
79. See Boubelik, 553 N.W.2d at 398.
80. Id.
81. See Rossbach v. FSB Mortgage Corp., 1998 WL 156303 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1998).
82. Complaint, supra note 39, at 3.
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
resentative capacity or a person acting as part of an organiza-
tional or commercial enterprise. It is information which relates
to that particular individual, not information in the aggregate
such as the bank telling MemberWorks that 55% of its customers
are male, 20% earn over $100,000, etc. The meaning of "confi-
dential" information is more elusive. In this case, however, the
Attorney General would have been helped enormously by the
bank having defined the term in its privacy policy. "It is our pol-
icy that all personal information you supply to us will be consid-
ered confidential."83  Therefore, for purposes of this case,
personal information is confidential information if it is informa-
tion the consumer supplied to the bank as contrasted with infor-
mation the bank obtained from other sources. The statement in
the posted privacy policy may explain why the Complaint's allega-
tion of a deceptive and misleading act is limited to the sale of
"information obtained from consumers." This raises the ques-
tion of whether the Attorney General could have successfully
argued that other types of information, such as information sup-
plied by third parties, or information gathered by the bank itself
could be regarded as confidential and protected even though
not within the meaning of "confidential" included in the bank's
privacy policy.
This inquiry also raises the issue of the degree to which a
bank or other seller of goods or services can define the parame-
ters of liability by clever wording of its privacy statement. It is
reasonable to assume the average consumer, reading the bank's
privacy statement, has the impression that the bank will protect
her privacy, and will fail to understand that information gleaned
from third parties and from the bank's own investigation is not
protected.
On the other hand, at the time of the lawsuit, no law
required banks or other sellers to have privacy policies, much less
to post them on Web sites. U.S. Bank went out on a limb by
adopting a policy and posting it for all to see. In doing so it was
dutifully complying with the recommendations, but not the legal
requirements, of its regulators. In the absence of specific statutes
establishing requirements, the bank can argue it could not rea-
sonably anticipate that its posted policy violated the Minnesota
Fraud Act or the common law right of privacy, neither of which
explicitly contemplate the situation at issue.
83. U.S. Bancorp, U.S. Bancorp Privacy Policy (visited March 16, 2000)
<http://usbank.com/privacy.html> ("It is our policy that all personal informa-
tion you supply to us will be considered confidential. This policy holds true no
matter how we receive your personal information; over the phone, at our
branches, through our ATMs, or online at this Web site.").
20001
838 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
The Attorney General might have alleged a violation of the
Minnesota Fraud Act even if the bank had not posted a privacy
policy on the Web. The Complaint states that the bank's cus-
tomer agreement does not inform consumers of the sale of confi-
dential information,84 and claims that the credit card agreement
is deceptive and misleading because it talks about selling infor-
mation in a paragraph titled "Affiliate Sharing," even though
information is sold to non-affiliated parties.85 Perhaps that
would be sufficient to prove a violation of the statute even if
there had been no posting on the Web.
The Complaint goes further than merely alleging that the
site does not inform customers that the bank will sell confidential
information to third parties.86 In addition, in the count alleging
a violation of Minnesota's Consumer Fraud statute, the Com-
plaint notes that the site does not advise customers of whether or
how they might opt-in or opt-out of the sale of information about
them to third parties.87 Furthermore, that count states that the
Web site does not give the consumer an option as to how the
bank "choose [s] to use" information about the consumer.88 This
raises the question whether the Attorney General was claiming
that a site would violate the statute unless it not only advised cus-
tomers the bank would sell information about them to third par-
ties, but also gave them these options.
The Complaint also alleges a violation of the Minnesota
Deceptive Trade Practice Act. The sections of this statute pro-
vide that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when he
represents that goods or services have characteristics, uses, or
benefits that they do not have,89 or engages in conduct which
"creates a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding."9' To
prove a claim under those provisions, the Attorney General
would have to show either that U.S. Bank had knowledge of the
deceptive trade practice or that the bank had a financial interest
in the goods or services deceptively offered for sale.91 The Attor-
ney General could prove that the bank knew of the deceptive
trade practice by showing that it had entered into the alleged
business arrangement whereby the bank shared information
84. See Complaint, supra note 39, at 64.
85. See id. at 65.
86. See id. at 1 61.
87. See id. at 62.
88. See id. at 63.
89. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325D.44(5) (West 1995).
90. See § 325D.44(13).
91. See Aequitron Med., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 964 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. N.Y.
1997) (citing § 325D.46(l)(a)).
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about consumers with MemberWorks while posting a privacy pol-
icy claiming that information would be confidential. The Attor-
ney General could prove that U.S. Bank had a financial interest
in .the services offered for sale by proving its allegations that the
bank received four million dollars plus a twenty-two percent com-
mission of the revenue from MemberWorks' sales to bank
customers.
The Attorney General alleged the bank violated the Minne-
sota Deceptive Trade Practices Act by representing that its serv-
ices had characteristics and benefits they do not have.
Presumably, the Attorney General could prove this by arguing
that the privacy policy represented that bank services had the
characteristic and benefit of information confidentiality, while in
fact their services did not have that characteristic or benefit. The
success of that argument might have depended upon the court's
willingness to regard the privacy policy as part of the contractual
obligation of the bank. The bank likely would have argued that
its contractual obligations were defined by those matters specifi-
cally contained in its written agreement with each consumer and
any matters incorporated by reference in that agreement. The
lack of a specific statute providing for consumer privacy creates
uncertainty in regard to the legal status of the privacy policy.
The Attorney General also alleged the bank violated the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act by engaging in conduct which cre-
ates the likelihood of confusion or misunderstanding.92 Presum-
ably the Attorney General could have proven this by showing that
consumers reading the representations in the privacy policy
would reasonably believe information would not be shared with
third parties, and therefore had a misunderstanding of the true
nature of the bank's information practices. The bank may have
argued, however, that there was no nexus between the posting of
the privacy policy and any particular transaction between the
bank and its customers. That is, posting the privacy policy was
done merely to inform customers, and was not done in connec-
tion with any transaction with the consumer; consequently, it
could not create the likelihood of confusion or
misunderstanding.
The Attorney General's final count under Minnesota stat-
utes alleged a violation of the false advertising law. That statute
provides that a corporation which publishes an advertisement
which contains representations which are "untrue, deceptive, or
misleading" is guilty of a misdemeanor and the advertisement
92. See § 325D.44(13).
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may be enjoined.9" In a civil action, the Attorney General would
have to prove:
1. Intent to sell merchandise or services;
2. Publication;




It is not clear that the Attorney General would have been
able to convince a court that the privacy policy was an advertise-
ment covered by this statute. As to the first requirement, the
bank's posting of its privacy policy was arguably done merely to
inform its customers of its policy, rather than as part of its strat-
egy for selling products or services. In regard to the second
requirement, there seems to have been publication by posting
the privacy policy on the Internet. The statute, however, lists
many types of media, but does not mention the Internet.95 Fur-
thermore, the listing is not precluded by-"including, but not
limited to"-the standard language indicating a listing is not
exclusive. A privacy statute drafted with Internet transactions in
mind would preclude the types of legal challenges which U.S.
Bank might have raised. In regard to the third requirement, it is
not clear that the posted privacy policy qualifies as an advertise-
ment. As explained above, the bank's intent may have been to
inform rather than to use the privacy policy as part of its market-
ing strategy to sell products. In addition, in a case brought
under the Minnesota Deceptive Trade Practice Act, one court
noted that one of the factors in typical advertisements is that the
representations are commercial speech.96 It is not clear that the
bank's privacy policy qualifies as commercial speech under Min-
nesota law.97 The Attorney General's case would be buttressed,
93. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.67 (West 1995).
94. See Lenscrafters, Inc. v. Vision World, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 1481, 1491
(D. Minn. 1996).
95. § 325F.67 provides that the publication or dissemination appears
"[I]n a newspaper or other publication, or in the form of a book, notice, hand-
bill, poster, bill, label, price tag, circular, pamphlet, program, or letter or over
any radio or television station, or in anything so offered to the public .... "
96. See Medical Graphics Corp. v. SensorMedics Corp., 872 F. Supp. 643,
650 (D. Minn. 1994).
97. See, e.g., State of Minn. v. Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d 882, 886
(1992) (commercial speech is that "which 'does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction.'") (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976)); cf Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (commercial
speech is "an expression related to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience.") (cited in Casino Mktg. Group, 491 N.W.2d at 886).
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however, by an FDIC pronouncement that every Web home page
constitutes an advertisement. 98
The Complaint also alleges a violation of Minnesota's com-
mon law right to privacy.'9 To support that allegation, the court
cites the Wal-Mart case. l °° In that 1998 case, the Minnesota
Supreme Court for the first time recognized the tort of invasion
of privacy. Although refusing to put its imprimatur on the pri-
vacy tort known as "false light," the court recognized intrusion
upon seclusion, appropriation, and publication. The Complaint
alleges a violation of all three of these torts.10 1 Given its recent
vintage, the appellate courts in Minnesota have not had the occa-
sion to apply it to any facts.'1 2 It is not clear, however, that the
Attorney General would have prevailed. The privacy tort of
intrusion upon seclusion "occurs when one 'intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion
of another in his private affairs or concerns ... if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person." 10 3
As applied to this case, one of the fundamental issues is
whether the bank intruded upon the consumers' private affairs
or concerns. This is not a situation where a telemarketer, unbe-
knownst to the consumer, secretly gathers information about the
consumer and uses it to sell a product to a consumer who never
even asked the telemarketer to call. Rather, U.S. Bank's custom-
ers had willingly supplied information to the bank in order to
obtain its services. Nevertheless, the bank has a problem because
the bank published a privacy policy which promised confidential-
ity. Because of that policy, the Attorney General could have
argued that consumers were misled when they voluntarily sup-
plied personal information to the bank. They did so expecting
98. See Walter Effross, Logos, Links, and Lending: Towards Standardized Pri-
vacy and Use Policies for Banking Web Sites, 24 OHIo N. U. L. REV. 747, 755 (1998).
99. Complaint, supra note 39, at 68.
100. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
101. Complaint, supra note 39, at 69-71.
102. In Wal-Mart, the court reversed the lower court's dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The
court did not opine on the merits except to say that a Wal-Mart employee's
distribution of a picture of two naked young women is a type of privacy "worthy
of protection" because "[o]ne's naked body is a very private part of one's per-
son and generally known to others only by choice." Wal-Mart, 582 N.W.2d at
235.
103. Id. at 233 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (1977)).
The complaint alleges that the sharing of consumer information was an "inten-
tional intrusion upon the private affairs or concerns . . . [which was] highly
offensive to a reasonable person." Complaint, supra note 39, at 69.
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that the bank would adhere to its own policy and keep it
confidential.
A harder case would arise if the bank did not publish a pri-
vacy policy, or published one that was ambiguous or equivocal.
In those instances, the Attorney General could not argue that
consumers relied on any bank promise. The question in these
situations is whether the law should regard personally identifi-
able information collected and shared in consumer transactions
as "a very private part of one's person" like the pictures of naked
women in Wal-Mart,1 4 and subject to the consumer's control
even if consumers did not rely on any bank promise of confiden-
tiality. Businesses can be expected to contend that the type of
information involved in consumer transactions should be
regarded as a commercial commodity, the control of which the
consumer relinquishes when she voluntarily supplies it to the
bank.10 5 In Minnesota, the Attorney General could have found
some support in case law, which holds that "a bank is generally
under a duty not to disclose the financial condition of its deposi-
tors."1" 6 The disclosure of the personal information in the U.S.
Bank case was not the same as information about the consumer's
financial condition. Nevertheless, the case law supports the gen-
eral notion that selling customer information to third parties
may constitute intruding upon seclusion.
C. The Settlement: Sachet or Saccharin?
Less than one month after the Complaint was filed, the bank
and the Attorney General signed a "Stipulation of Settlement"
(Settlement).1"7 The Settlement and accompanying proposed
Final Judgment illustrate the opportunities provided by a state
Attorney General, rather than an individual consumer, suing
under general law such as the Minnesota Consumer Fraud Act
and the common law right of privacy.10 8 If instead, Minnesota
had enacted a specific law aimed at consumer privacy and the
Attorney General had based its claims on it, that statute would
104. Wal-Mart, 582 N.W.2d at 235.
105. See text infta accompanying note 12 (Intro discussion of Lessig).
106. Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn.
1976).
107. Stipulation of Settlement, State of Minnesota v. US Bank, Court File
No. 99-872 (D. Minn. June 30, 1999) [hereinafter Settlement].
108. The complaint also alleged violations of specific provisions of vari-
ous statutes such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Minnesota's deceptive
trade practice act as well as a provision creating liability for false advertising.
Nevertheless, as discussed below, the Settlement's remedies are not directly
related to remedies in these statutes.
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likely contain a specific provision on remedies which would not
authorize some of the innovative types of remedies in the con-
sent order in this case.' 0 9 At the same time, the Settlement and
Final Judgment contain serious limitations, demonstrating the
restrictions which result from negotiated settlements which
require each party to compromise. If the Attorney General had
been able to rely on a consumer privacy statute, he might not
have needed to accept some of these limitations.
One of the major weaknesses of the Settlement is the lack of
any legally binding adjudication, admission, finding, or conclu-
sion that anything the bank did violated any law. Therefore, in a
strictly legal sense, the case accomplished nothing in terms of
precedent." While the Complaint requested the court to
declare the bank's actions violated several statutes, the Settle-
ment provides: "Nothing in this Stipulation constitutes, and
nothing herein shall be construed to mean or imply, that
Defendants have engaged in any wrongdoing or violations of law,
or that they have made any express or implied admission of any
wrongdoing or violation."
11'
Under the terms of the Settlement, the bank agreed to make
refunds to all Minnesota customers who apply for a refund of any
fees they paid to any "Unaffiliated Third Party" in connection
with the sale of a non-financial product or service since June 1,
1997 as long as the bank shared "Customer Data"112 with that
third party and the customer did not use the program or services.
On the one hand, this is a sweeping remedy. The Settlement
defines "Unaffiliated Third Party" as "any person who is not an
Affiliate of U.S. Bancorp." It is not known if there were other
third parties besides MemberWorks, but the Settlement never-
theless is notable in ostensibly enlarging the protected class of
consumers far beyond the original lawsuit.
The Settlement also resolves the problem of determining
what items constitute personal information entitled to protection
by listing twenty-three types of information. This raises the ques-
tion of whether a statute can ever adequately fulfill this role. The
109. The statute could overcome this limitation by including a phrase
such as: "The court may order such other legal and equitable remedy as is
appropriate to the case and which furthers the purposes of the Act."
110. As described above, the litigation produced immediate results,
including the announcement by two major financial institutions that they
would no longer enter into joint marketing arrangement for non-financial
products such as that between the bank and MemberWorks.
111. Settlement, supra note 107, at 5.
112. The settlement includes a definition of "Customer Data" which lists
twenty-three items. See id. at 8.
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list in the Settlement was drafted in light of the specific transac-
tions involved and the types of information which the Attorney
General, through discovery, learned were shared with
MemberWorks.113 Other types of information may be relevant to
other transactions. In addition, in the future, businesses will
develop new products and marketing strategies, and new forms
of payment devices will be used. Therefore, a consumer privacy
statute may not sufficiently describe the types of information cov-
ered. This can be partially ameliorated by including in the stat-
ute a provision such as: "The personally identifiable information
protected under this Act includes, but is not limited to ... The
Attorney General shall have the authority to promulgate addi-
tional types of personally identifiable information as appropriate
to effectuate the purposes of the Act and to clarify its appli-
cation."
On the other hand, this part of the Settlement is quite
restricted in extending relief only to Minnesota customers. US
Bank is a national bank doing business in several states1 14 and US
Bancorp, US Bank's parent, is a multistate bank holding com-
pany.1 15 Consumers in other states can obtain relief from the
bank's practices only if the Attorneys General of those states or
consumer class actions are successfully brought. The success of
actions in those other states will depend upon the presence and
strength of statutory grounds and common law rights in those
states. Thus, even if the Minnesota case had not been settled and
a court had adjudicated the bank in violation of Minnesota law,
the bank's conduct could have been found entirely lawful if and
when lawsuits are filed in other states. This situation, requiring
lawsuits in every state where the bank does business, fails to
ensure that consumers will be protected. In addition, banks and
other e-commerce businesses are faced with a confusing variety
of laws, making it difficult to plan business strategies. This con-
cern would be solved by passing a federal statute, thus imposing
uniform rules on all banks. Uniform rules ease the banks' prob-
lem of having to comply with the laws of many different jurisdic-
tions. Consumers are highly mobile, often changing residence
from state to state. Uniform rules also would reduce consumer
confusion; once the consumer learns one set of rules, she can be
confident they apply wherever she moves.
Other provisions of the Settlement provided for the bank to
pay $500,000 to the State of Minnesota, $1,500,000 to Minnesota
113. See Complaint, supra note 39, at 16.
114. See id. at 7.
115. See id. at 9.
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chapters of Habitat for Humanity, as well as $1,043,000 to regu-
lated charities or public bodies in states other than Minnesota.
The total amount represents the bank's total revenue, without
any deduction for expenses, from sharing customer information
for purposes of marketing non-financial products.1 16 In addi-
tion, a provision of the Settlement is designed to prevent non-
Minnesota customers from receiving more in similar litigation
brought in other states. Such innovative remedies may well have
been impossible if the Attorney General had been acting pursu-
ant to a specific privacy statute.
The Final Judgment and Order for Injunctive and Con-
sumer Relief (Judgment) provides that the bank and its affiliates
shall not share customer data with unaffiliated third parties for
the purpose of marketing non-financial products or services of
unaffiliated third parties."' 7 The definition of "nonfinancial
products or services" is crucial. The Judgment, however, does
not define this term. Rather, it defines "financial products or
services.,"118 Presumably, every product or service which does not
come within this definition qualifies as a "nonfinancial product
or service."
This is a sweeping order, affecting the bank's practices, not
only in relation to the third party involved in this case,
MemberWorks, but also to all other present and future third par-
ties who market such products or services. The Judgment, how-
ever, raises but does not answer several related questions. For
instance, can US Bank share information with unaffiliated third
parties for purposes unrelated to marketing non-financial prod-
ucts or services, but related to other purposes? For example, can
U.S. Bank share information with XYZ company where XYZ does
not use the information for marketing such products or services,
but instead sells the information to ABC, Inc., which does market
these products? Another question is how the Judgment affects
other Minnesota banks. Does the Judgment stand as a warning
that all banks doing business in that state are in violation of Min-
116. See Settlement, supra note 107, at 14(d).
117. SeeJudgment, State of Minnesota v. US Bank, Court File No. 99-872
(D. Minn. June 30, 1999) [hereinafterJudgment]. The bank also is required to
"maintain all data bases in a manner that allows their separation in the event of
divestiture and the preservation of confidentiality of Customer Data in such
event." Id. at 15.
118. Id. at 10. "Financial Products or Services" are defined as regulated
securities or insurance products or services, making loans or extending credit
and related services, leasing and trust and asset management services. The
refund provision of the Settlement is included in the judgment. Id. at 18.
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nesota laws if they share information with marketers of non-
financial information?
What if another Minnesota bank provides consumers with
an opt-in opportunity? That is, the bank will share information
with marketers of non-financial information only if the consumer
affirmatively notifies the bank that the bank has the consumer's
permission to do so. Assume the bank also clearly discloses this
practice in its written brochures and contracts and on its Web
site. Would the Attorney General regard that as violating state
law? It would be contrary to the U.S. BankJudgment in allowing
sharing with these third parties, but may not be regarded by the
Attorney General as violating state law because this hypothetical
bank uses a substantially different procedure than was present in
the U.S. Bank case.
The Judgment includes several mandatory disclosures. The
bank is required to disclose its privacy policy "conspicuously and
clearly, in written communications.""11 The disclosure must be
made when the customer purchases a product and annually. Dis-
closures must "clearly list each category of information" the bank
proposes to share with affiliates for direct marketing purposes or
third parties for purposes of marketing that third party's finan-
cial products or services. In addition, the bank must disclose
"the specific purpose for the sharing of information." Finally,
customers must be given a method for opting-out of the bank's
sharing of customer data with affiliates and unaffiliated third par-
ties when they engage in the above types of marketing activi-
ties. 120 If a customer exercises the option to opt-out, the bank
must remove the customer's name from its direct marketing lists
and lists it provides to third parties for purposes of marketing
financial products.
Implicit in the Judgment's provision requiring disclosure of
its privacy policy is the requirement that the bank have a privacy
policy. Also significant is the provision applying the opt-out, not
only to the bank's sharing information with third parties, but also
with its affiliates. This was a matter of major contention in the
battle over federal privacy legislation governing financial
institutions. 121
It is not clear whether other banks doing business in Minne-
sota also must follow these disclosure and opt-out requirements
or risk action by the Attorney General. As discussed above,1 22 the
119. Id. at 19.
120. See id.
121. See infra text accompanying notes 274-76
122. See supra text accompanying note 105.
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
Richfield case's 12 holding that banks are under a general duty
not to disclose the financial condition of their customers estab-
lishes a legal precedent for consumer privacy. In effect, the Judg-
ment permits banks to violate this privacy when the consumer
consents under an opt-out procedure. The issue which then
arises is whether opt-out makes it too easy for the bank to avoid
the privacy duty, and whether opt-in should be required instead.
Another opt-out provision in the Judgment applies to cus-
tomers opening a credit card or depository account. 124 Custom-
ers must be provided a notice of the opportunity to opt-out of
the bank's cross-marketing activities by electing not to permit the
bank to share customer data. This applies both to sharing data
with affiliates for direct marketing, and to third parties for pur-
poses of marketing financial products or services. The notice
also must be provided annually.
These opt-out provisions raise the issue of what happens if
the consumer chooses to opt-out. May the bank refuse to do
business with that consumer? Is that a valid reason for refusing
to extend credit or to refuse to open a depository account? May
the bank terminate current customers if they opt-out? In the
alternative, since those consumers who opt-out are less profitable
to the bank, may the bank charge higher fees to those consumers
or refuse to offer certain services such as free checks?
Other provisions permit modification of the terms of the
Judgment under specified conditions. For example, the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) may modify the
Order "if it deems so appropriate in respect to the ability of
Defendants to conduct their business relative to the use or disclo-
sure of Customer Data in a manner comparable to that of other
national banks."125 In addition, the bank can petition the court
for a modification which may be granted if it can show it is at a
"competitive disadvantage to other national banks" because of
the Judgment's restrictions on the use or disclosure of customer
information. Furthermore, certain key provisions will not be
binding on a successor organization if the bank merges and the
transaction value at the time of the merger's announcement is
equal to twenty-five percent of the pre-announcement market
capitalization of U.S. Bancorp. Finally, the bank may seek a mod-
ification if new federal statutes or regulations applicable to
123. Richfield Bank & Trust Co. v. Sjogren, 244 N.W.2d 648, 651 (Minn.
1976).
124. SeeJudegment, supra note 117, at 14. An exception is made for co-
branded and affinity credit card programs. The bank is allowed to share cus-
tomer data in regard to these programs. See id. at 21.
125. Id. at I 24(A).
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national banks are enacted which the bank believes requires
modification of the Judgment. Now that Congress has enacted a
new federal law, U.S. Bank may take advantage of this provision
to seek a substantial revision of the Judgment.
These provisions illustrate the very fluid environment in
which financial institutions operate today. The Judgment takes
into account the variety of authorities to which U.S. Bank is sub-
ject. Because U.S. Bank is a national bank, the Judgment had to
take into account the OCC's possible future exercise of its regula-
tory powers. In addition to the Attorney General's continuing
monitoring of the bank, the court is still a participant: the bank
can petition the court for modification of the Order, and the
Attorney General can go back to the court if it believes the Order
is not being followed. The Judgment recognizes that the bank
operates in an era of constant mergers and acquisitions, and that
federal statutes and regulations affecting the Judgment may be
enacted. These provisions also provide lessons for possible legis-
lative action. State privacy legislation may have a different
impact from bank to bank depending on whether an institution
is a state chartered institution, a national bank, a thrift, or a
credit union. Depending on what type of institution it is, the
bank will be subject, not only to the state law, but also to various
federal laws and regulations, some of which may preempt the
state law. In addition, because of the rapidly changing nature of
financial institutions and the marketplace, both common law
and statutes run the risk of not being suitably adapted to new
conditions.
The Judgment is deficient in not providing adequate protec-
tion in the sharing of information to those using it to market
financial products. The Fair Information Practices principles
adopted by the federal government and a European Union
Directive include requiring companies to give individuals access
to the information the company has about the individuals."2 6
Furthermore, the individual has some control over the quality of
the information. The principles allow the individual to correct
erroneous and incomplete information. It is understandable
that the Judgment does not include provisions guaranteeing con-
sumer access and control, given the lack of statutory basis for
requiring these. This illustrates, however, the inadequacy of reli-
ance on current law to adequately protect consumer privacy.
Finally, despite the fact that the Complaint was based, in
part, on the bank's failure to comply with the privacy policy it
posted on the Web, the Judgment fails to take electronic com-
126. See SwiRE & LITAN, supra note 6, at 29.
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merce into account. For instance, the Judgment requires the
bank to disclose its privacy policy to its customers "in written
communication" at various times.1 27 May the bank satisfy this
requirement by posting the policy on its website if in its paper
communication devices, brochures and contracts, it clearly noti-
fies consumers the policy is on the Web? Does "written commu-
nication" include text on a website? Many states recently have
enacted laws providing that electronic records have the same
legal validity as paper documents.1 21 Should posting privacy poli-
cies on the Web be satisfactory at least for consumers who have
signed home banking agreements whereby they directly express
their desire to do their banking on the Web? What is the effect
of posting a privacy policy on the Web? The Judgment would
have been more effective if it had included a provision indicating
that the bank would take steps to ensure that the policy posted
on the Web accurately reflects actual bank practice and proce-
dure. Further, the Judgment could have stated that if the bank
made changes to its privacy policy, it would notify its customers
in paper communications of those changes, as well as on its Web
site.
Perhaps the most important lesson of the U.S. Bank case is
that the lack of consumer privacy law does not provide banks and
others with immunity. A determined state official, and possibly a
determined consumer, may be able to fashion a viable cause of
action out of current statutory and common law. Moreover, even
if the plaintiff does not win by obtaining a court determination
that the company violated the consumers' privacy rights, the firm
may well lose the most important battle of all: it may lose the
public's trust.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S AMBIVALENT POSITION
The federal government has issued various reports and pro-
nouncements about consumer privacy on the Internet for several
years."' Although expressing concern and detailing potential
privacy and security problems and the tremendous harm to con-
sumers they could cause, until Congress enacted privacy legisla-
tion in October, 1999, government agencies contended that for
the time being, the preferable approach is to trust that industry
will adopt adequate self-regulation, making legislative action
unnecessary. Even though Congress has passed legislation, fed-
eral agencies will play a major role issuing regulations and
127. Judgment, supra note 117, at 19.
128. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-12-1 to 10-12-5 (1994).
129. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 860-68.
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enforcing the law.13° In addition, that legislation is limited in
scope. Therefore, agencies will have to decide what further
action on their part is appropriate in regard to matters not cov-
ered by the law. As a result, it is instructive to examine their
approach to consumer privacy prior to passage of the new
statute.
Ira Magaziner, formerly President Clinton's adviser on
Internet policy, articulated the Administration's opposition to
privacy legislation, in part, by pointing out agencies' inability to
police cyberspace:
[E]ven if you passed a thousand pages of privacy protec-
tion, on the Internet, you can't enforce it. Because there is
no government agency that is going to be able to monitor
the 10,000 Web sites that are formatted every week. So
essentially you are making a false promise [of protection]
to your citizens.
1 31
Magaziner assumes that if Congress were to pass privacy legisla-
tion which included authorizing a government agency to enforce
the law, Americans would regard that as a guarantee that the
agency would be able to ensure complete compliance with that
law. Therefore, because it is impossible to ensure even close to
100% enforcement of an Internet privacy law, we should not
enact any legislation.
If Magaziner's reasoning were followed, Congress should
repeal all consumer and investor protection laws, because it is
impossible to guarantee perfect enforcement of those laws. His
conclusion that no laws should be enacted is based on the
assumption that when a statute empowers a government agency
to enforce a law, the public takes that as a promise by the govern-
ment that the agency can protect them whenever they engage in
conduct for which the statute provides protection. It is unrea-
sonable to believe consumers have such an optimistic view of the
effectiveness of government agencies in a free democratic soci-
ety. Moreover, Magaziner assumes the only possible enforce-
ment mechanism is through government agencies. A statute
which includes a private right of action with statutory damages,
punitive damages, attorney's fees and class actions would provide
an additional source of potential enforcement.
Magaziner's reluctance to provide government agencies with
an explicit statutory mandate to ensure consumer privacy is
shared by the agencies themselves. In May, 1999, the Office of
130. See infra text accompanying note 207.
131. Ira Magaziner, Magaziner: Momentum is Shifting, in GOVERNMENT
TECHNOLOGY, E-CoMMERCE 42 (1998).
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the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued "guidance" to
national banks in the matter of Web site privacy.' 3 2 The gui-
dance provides examples of practices and procedures banks have
implemented. The OCC stressed the critical nature of consumer
privacy in explaining why it issued the guidance. The OCC
pointed out that "a fundamental component of the bank/cus-
tomer relationship is a customer's trust in the institution to
respect the privacy and confidentiality of that relationship." 3 '
Citing survey evidence, the OCC stressed that it is even more
important to reassure consumers about their privacy in an on-
line environment. The OCC not only describes consumer expec-
tations of privacy and security, but categorizes them as "legiti-
mate expectations."134
After building its argument that Internet consumer privacy
is of crucial importance, the OCC then explains that national
banks are not required to adopt any of the practices or proce-
dures described in the guidance. "These examples are not exam-
ination standards, do not impose new regulatory requirements
on banks, and are not intended to be an exclusive description of
the various ways banks can devise and communicate effective pri-
vacy policies. '"135 In other words, ensuring consumer privacy and
security on the Internet is something national banks should defi-
nitely should be doing, but it's entirely up to those banks
whether or not to actually do it.
The OCC then describes various ways in which banks cur-
rently communicate their privacy policies to consumers, proce-
dures employed to develop an effective privacy policy, methods
to ensure that third parties act consistently with the bank's pri-
vacy policy, and mechanisms for dealing with consumer com-
plaints and inquiries. The memorandum fails to distinguish
among practices and procedures which are sound and should be
followed in all situations, and those for which banks should
always have flexibility because of the different sizes and types of
national banks and the various types of reasonable alternative
methods of achieving the same objectives. In failing to make
these distinctions, the guidance fails to provide meaningful gui-
dance and demonstrates just how gun-shy the OCC is about con-
sumer privacy.
132. Julie L. Williams, Guidance to National Banks on Web Site Privacy State-
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For example, the guidance does not require banks to have a
privacy policy, nor to post a privacy policy if they have one. The
OCC's reluctance to require banks to have a policy is understand-
able in the absence of a statutory mandate. It would not seem
unduly brash, however, to suggest that the OCC could have at
least strongly recommended that, if a bank has adopted a privacy
policy, it should make that policy known to its customers. The
guidance is somewhat confusing in encompassing general bank
privacy policy although the focus is ostensibly on bank Internet
sites."16 The confusion arises, for example, in its discussion of
how banks that choose to communicate their privacy policy go
about doing so. The OCC notes that some banks post their pri-
vacy policy only on their Web sites, whereas others provide paper
copies of the policy. The OCC should have opined that a bank
should always have a paper copy of their privacy policy for those
consumers who do not have accounts that can be accessed
through the Web, or who have accounts that can be accessed
either at a physical site or on the Web, but who choose not to use
the Web option.
The memorandum also describes various ways of satisfying
the OCC's recommendation that privacy policy be made in dis-
closures that are "clear, prominent, and easy to understand."'
137
Illustrations include placing links on the bank home page and
putting the policy on transaction pages where they are automati-
cally displayed once the consumer chooses what type of transac-
tion he or she wants to engage in. It is appropriate for the OCC
to provide examples rather than lay down rigid rules: banks need
flexibility in deciding how to disclose their privacy policy. How-
ever, it is essential that a bank's actual practices be consistent
with the official privacy policy it has disclosed. Rather than com-
ing right out and stating this as a given, the OCC states the fol-
lowing: "Banks with effective privacy policies also take steps to
ensure that their internal policies and procedures are consistent
with and support stated privacy promises." '
Another example of the OCC's disconcerting failure to state
what should be regarded as a necessary bank practice relates to a
bank's relationship with third parties. Some banks have a privacy
policy which promises that any information shared with unaffili-
ated third parties is subject to the same confidentiality protec-
136. See id. ("Although this guidance is targeted at banks that operate
Web sites, the examples of practices and procedures for developing and imple-
menting privacy policies are pertinent to any national bank considering estab-
lishing or revising a privacy policy and related procedures.").
137. Id.
138. Id.
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tions as when the information is in the possession of the bank. It
should follow that banks with such a privacy policy should take
steps to ensure that those third parties are complying with the
representations made in the bank's policy. The OCC, however,
refuses to state the obvious, instead merely noting that several
banks require third parties to enter into confidentiality agree-
ments and agree to limit use of information they receive from
the bank, and that some banks monitor the third parties for com-
pliance with these agreements or provide consumers with the
opportunity to opt-out of information sharing. While it is under-
standable that the OCC would hesitate to mandate specific pro-
cedures, by not even recommending that banks implement any
procedures to assure themselves that third parties are adhering
to the bank's policy, the OCC leaves the impression that banks
can merely post a policy promising the confidentiality of infor-
mation shared with third parties, and then do nothing to moni-
tor compliance. The problem with such a practice is that
consumers reading the policy statement will reasonably assume
that the bank is doing something to make sure its promises in
regard to confidentiality of information are monitored and
enforced.
The OCC's guidance instead merely describes two alterna-
tive bank practices: one is for the bank to monitor compliance,
and the other is to provide consumers with the opportunity to
opt-out. Presumably, the OCC is suggesting banks have these two
options: either monitor third party compliance, or allow consum-
ers to opt-out. For the consumer opt-out to be a meaningful
choice, the bank should be required to disclose the following to
consumers: "Although the bank promises in its privacy policy
that information shared with unaffiliated third parties is subject
to the same confidentiality guarantee as that information when
in the possession of the bank, the bank does not monitor compli-
ance by those third parties. Because the bank does not monitor
compliance, you have the opportunity to opt-out and thereby
prevent the bank from sharing information about you."
Noticeably absent from the OCC's discussion is any hint that
banks that share information with third parties and do nothing
to ensure the confidentiality of that information when in the
hands of third parties should disclose that crucial fact to consum-
ers. Also absent is any recommendation that banks make certain
their employees understand the bank's privacy policy, or that
banks institute procedures to deter employees from violating the
policy. The OCC does not recommend banks construct firewalls
so only employees with a need to know have access to the infor-
mation. Finally, the OCC fails to recommend that banks estab-
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lish mechanisms for dealing with consumer complaints or
questions about privacy. Instead, the OCC merely describes prac-
tices and procedures which some banks have adopted in regard
to these items.
This examination of the OCC's 1999 guidance suggests sev-
eral ways in which financial institutions can protect consumer
privacy. As regulatory agencies, including the OCC, draft regula-
tions pursuant to the privacy provisions of the recently enacted
Financial Institution Modernization Act, they may find these sug-
gestions helpful.
InJuly, 1999, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a
report entitled Self-Regulation and Privacy Online: A Report to Con-
gress.139 That Report nicely illustrates three distinct views of
whether there is a need for privacy legislation for consumers in
electronic commerce. The Report also demonstrates the mark-
edly different perceptions of reality which well-informed persons
occupying major policy-making, regulatory and enforcement
roles can have when evaluating identical data. The FTC voted 3-
1 to issue the Report. Commissioner Sheila Anthony concurred
in part and dissented in part. Commissioner Orson Swindle
issued a concurring statement.
The Report noted that the need to protect privacy was rec-
ognized and practices and procedures to accomplish that were
developed over twenty-five years ago, in 1973.14° That was the
year when the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
developed fair information practice principles which have since
been adopted by government agencies in the United States, Can-
ada, and Europe.' 4 ' The Report was the latest of many FTC pri-
vacy projects; the FTC has been "deeply involved in addressing
online privacy issues" '142 since 1995.143 The Report found that
while "[i] n some areas there has been much progress,"' 44 the vast
majority of commercial Web sites have not implemented all four
of the fair information practice principles applicable to private
companies. 145 The Report examined "seal" programs in which
139. FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N, SELF REGULATION AND PRIVACY ONLINE: A
REPORT TO CONGRESS (1999) [hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS].
140. See id. at 3.
141. See id. The five principles are: "(1) Notice/Awareness; (2) Choice/
Consent; (3) Access/Participation; (4) Integrity/Security; and (5) Enforce-
ment/Redress." Id.
142. Id.
143. See id. at n.16.
144. Id. at 6.
145. See id. The FTC did not apply the principle of "Security/Integrity" to
private industry. The FTC commended IBM, Microsoft, and Disney for their
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independent organizations, including the Better Business
Bureau, issue privacy standards, and permit companies which fol-
low those standards to display the organization's seal of approval
on their Web site.146 The FTC viewed seal programs as a positive
development, for they allow consumers to identify companies
which have agreed to follow specific standards established by a
third party. 47 The FTC found, however, that "[o]nly a small
minority of commercial Web sites" had become members of seal
programs.' 48 Despite finding industry failure to adhere to basic
privacy principles or to participate in seal programs, the FTC
concluded: "Based on these facts, the Commission believes that
legislation to address online privacy is not appropriate at this
time. "149
Commissioner Swindle voted to submit the FTC Report
"reluctantly" because he felt it did not reflect reality.'5 ° He
believed industry had made "substantial progress," and "signifi-
cant progress," considering the FTC had "articulated the ele-
ments of these four practices in detail just one year ago." 15' He
faulted the Report for not giving sufficient prominence to a 1999
Georgetown University study. That study found that a majority of
frequently visited sites implemented one of the fair information
principles, "Notice/Awareness," by informing consumers of "at
least some of their information practices." 152  Swindle also
faulted the Report for not emphasizing its conclusion that no
legislation was necessary. Instead, the Report mentions its con-
clusion at the end of the Report "as if the recommendation is
some trivial afterthought.'
1 53
Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony concurred in part and dis-
sented in part. While Swindle cited the Georgetown study as evi-
dence of the substantial progress industry had made, Anthony
was "dismayed" by both that study and a study commissioned by
the Online Privacy Alliance (OPA study) .1 5 ' Anthony inter-
preted these studies as showing that there is "an enormous gap
between" the collection of data online and the protection of that
policy of refusing to advertise on Web sites that do not follow fair information
practices. See id. at 12-13.
146. See id. at 9-12.
147. See id. at 9.
148. Id. at 12.
149. Id.
150. Id. (Separate Statement of Commissioner Orson Swindle).
151. Id.
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id.
154. Id. (Statement of Commissioner Sheila F. Anthony Concurring in
Part and Dissenting in Part).
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data through implementation of the four principles. Only ten to
twenty percent of the sites in the survey followed all four of the
principles. Anthony, in sharp contrast to Swindle, found indus-
try progress "far too slow" considering the FTC had been urging
compliance with fair information practices since 1996. She con-
cluded that "the time may be right for federal legislation to estab-
lish at least baseline minimum standards."' 55 While Swindle
feared the "likely adverse unintended consequences" of legisla-
tion,116 Anthony believed legislation was necessary because the
lack of a federal statute "will undermine consumer confidence
and hinder the advancement of electronic commerce and
trade."'57
It is understandable that the Report seemed to have buried
its conclusion that no legislation was necessary, given that its
findings of fact would seem to point to the opposite conclusion.
In addition, the Report's superficial examination of seal pro-
grams and its complete failure to acknowledge the inherent limi-
tations of self-regulation1 58 reflect either the refusal to come to
grips with crucial issues, or the recognition that the only way to
obtain the votes necessary for the FTC to approve a report
required by Congress was to pretend these issues do not exist.
The Report found the emergence of seal programs "[a] n
encouraging development,"' 59 and it described the ways in which
they establish standards, require licensees to comply with the
standards, and employ various methods to monitor compliance.
The Report avoids closely scrutinizing the programs, however,
ignoring obvious systemic deficiencies which have significant
implications for whether they can play a meaningful role in obvi-
ating the need for any privacy legislation. For example, the
Report does not analyze in detail the agreements which licensees
are required to sign. In describing a program operated by
TrustE, the Report notes that licensees must "follow the stan-
dards for notice, choice, access and security" developed by the
Online Privacy Alliance (OPA).1 60 The OPA is described by the
FTC as "a coalition of industry groups,"161 raising the issue of
whether it is the appropriate organization to determine privacy




158. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 874-77.
159. REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 139, at 9.
160. Id. at 10.
161. Id. at 8.
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industry, privacy advocates and government representatives. 16 2
More importantly, the Report does not compare the details of
the OPA standards with the accepted fair information practices
standards developed by HEW or those established by the Organi-
zation for Economic Development and Cooperation (OECD) in
Europe.
163
The Report also describes other seal programs, such as that
operated by the Better Business Bureau.'64 As with its treatment
of TrustE, the Report is entirely superficial, and does not
examine the merits of any of these programs. At the least, it
would have been helpful for the F1C to compare the distinguish-
ing features of each program to one another. The Report also
could have compared who is eligible for membership in each
program to determine if there are certain types of businesses
who could not qualify even if they were willing to comply with the
standards. For example, the membership fees may be too high
for mom and pop businesses to be able to afford. Analysis and
comparison also is needed of the membership agreements' defi-
nitions of what data is covered, whether sharing of information
with affiliates is proscribed in any way, and how the term "affili-
ates" is defined. Are the licensing standards set in stone for all
time, or may they be changed? If they are changed, will consum-
ers be alerted? And if they do change, what the seal meant yes-
terday may be different from what it means today and will mean
tomorrow. For example, TrustE has changed its agreement and
some licensees are subject only to the prior agreement.
165
The importance of the details of the agreement became evi-
dent when Microsoft launched Windows 98. During the online
registration process, Microsoft collected from the consumers'
computers "global unique identifiers."' 6 6 This was done without
informing consumers, 167 even where consumers had specificallyinformed Microsoft they did not want to have this type of proce-
162. The OPA Web site lists the businesses and associations which belong
to the OPA. The author was not able to identify any privacy advocacy organiza-
tions among its members. See Privacy Alliance, (visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://
www.privacyalliance.org/who>.
163. See SwiRE & LITAN, supra note 6, at 23-25.
164. See REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 139, at 10. See also BBBOnline,
A Better Business Bureau Program (visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://www.bbbonline.
com>.
165. See REPORT TO CONCRESS, supra note 139, at 19 n.47.
166. Rachel Chalmers, TrustE Lets Microsoft Off on a Technicality, COM-
PUTERGRAM INT'L, Mar. 24, 1999, available in 1999 WL 8110353.
167. See Lisa Guernsey, Can They Cut It? Privacy Seals Don't Mean It's a Lock
That a Web Site Will Keep Your Information Confidential, CHICAGO TRIB., June 11,
1999, available in 1999 WL 2882191.
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dure performed. 6 8 TrustE publicly acknowledged that Microsoft
had "compromise [d] consumer trust and privacy," 169 but refused
to invoke its authority under its seal agreement with Microsoft to
conduct an independent audit or to revoke its seal.17' TrustE
explained that its agreement covers only the Microsoft.com Web
site. Because the unique identifiers were not collected pursuant
to interaction with that site, the agreement was not violated and
there was no basis on which to revoke the seal. One may ques-
tion whether consumers will understand the limited scope of the
seal's protection, even if they read the company's privacy policy
and explanation of the seal program.
The Microsoft incident caused many to question the rela-
tionship between the members who had qualified for the seal
and the company which approved their membership and decides
whether they have complied with the terms for continued display
of the seal. Microsoft and nine other companies, in addition to
membership fees, are also sponsors of TrustE, contributing
$100,000 each year.171 Microsoft has joined the Better Business
Bureau board of directors,1 72 and several companies who are
sponsors of TrustE have offered to sponsor BBBOnLine as
well. 1 73 This has led to the charge that there is a conflict of inter-
est between the "independent" organizations awarding the seals
and the companies applying for the seals.
174
TrustE and other programs do not want to "dictate specific
practices" to companies who join the program.175 This is reason-
able, since TrustE wants to have one-size-fits-all rules and stan-
dards, rather than different requirements depending upon
whether the site offers financial services, an auction format, or
sells prescription drugs. That means, however, that hundreds of
companies display the same seal, but have very different privacy
policies.176 In addition, contrary to reasonable consumer expec-
tations, the mere presence of the seal in no way guarantees that
168. See Chalmers, supra note 166.
169. Id.
170. See Jeri Clausing, On-line Privacy Group Decides Not to Pursue Microsoft
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9876310.
171. See Helen Dancer, Can we trust in TrustE, ABIX, May 11, 1999, avail-
able in 1999 WL 2293496. Other sponsors include America Online and Net-
scape. See also Guernsey, supra note 167.
172. See Microsoft Joins BBBOnLine Board of Directors, M2 PREssWIRE, Dec. 9,
1998, available in 1999 WL 16539604.
173. See Guernsey, supra note 167.
174. See id. See also Dancer, supra note 171.
175. Guernsey, supra note 167.
176. See id.
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the site operator will not sell the consumer's personal informa-
tion.
1 7 7
In addition, there are certain systemic deficiencies in any
self-regulation seal program. Memberships are voluntary. Com-
panies which do not follow fair information practices are the
least likely to join a program. 178 Programs have a variety of
mechanisms to monitor compliance with the membership agree-
ment.179 But a company which desires a seal and is unwilling to
undergo stringent monitoring, can simply join a program with
less rigorous requirements. If the free market works, enterpris-
ing firms will offer such programs if there is sufficient demand.
It then becomes a matter of consumers, not only remembering
to examine each Web site to see if it contains a privacy seal, but
also learning to distinguish weak seal programs from strong ones.
Rather than even alluding to any of the above, the FTC Report
merely acknowledges that "[i]t may be appropriate, at some
point in the future, for the FTC to examine the online privacy
seal programs and report to Congress on whether these pro-
grams provide effective protections for consumers.
''180
While seal programs have much merit and should be one
part of industry self-regulation, it is questionable that they should
be regarded as ajustification for not enacting privacy legislation.
As noted above there can be wide variations in the extent to
which such a program actually protects consumer privacy. No
matter how good some seal programs are, it will take years before
consumers are sufficiently knowledgeable about seal programs
and the differences among them, to be able to intelligently
decide which sites to avoid based on which seals they display.
Finally, given the tens of thousands of Web shopping sites, and
the marginal status and questionable longevity of many mom and
pop Web enterprises, it may unrealistic to assume that even the
majority of Web businesses will join seal programs.
In addition to its superficial treatment of seal programs, the
FTC Report fails to confront the essential systemic deficiencies of
all types of self-regulation. Chief among these is the absence of
the fifth HEW principle "Enforcement/Redress." '181 As discussed
177. See id.
178. See Budnitz, supra note 6, at 875.
179. TrustE periodically reviews licensees' compliance with their agree-
ment, uses a technique known as "seeding" to test whether consumers' opt-out
decisions are honored, requires members to provide consumers with a way to
express concerns and ask questions, and employs third party auditors. See
REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 139, at 10.
180. Id. at 13.
181. Id. at 3.
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above, 182 even a state Attorney General might have trouble prov-
ing a case of privacy invasion absent legislation specifically tai-
lored to deal with that conduct. A consumer would face major
hurdles arguing that the consumer has a cause of action against a
company violating standards set by voluntary self-regulation.
III. FEDERAL LEGISLATION
A. General Considerations
While federal agencies and others continued to debate
whether privacy legislation is necessary to protect consumers and
to provide them with a level of comfort which will ensure neces-
sary e-commerce volume, in 1999, Congress considered a
number of consumer privacy bills. In the closing days of the first
session of the 106th Congress, it enacted the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act (Modernization Act)
which contains significant provisions on consumer privacy.183
The Modernization Act, the bills which were not enacted, and
the preceding examination of the Minnesota case and federal
agency response illustrate that, even if there is consensus that
federal legislation is needed, the task of drafting satisfactory legis-
lation is a difficult one for two reasons. First, there are a great
many facets to consumer privacy, and hard decisions must be
made as to which facets require legislation. Second, within each
facet, it is hard to know how to attain a satisfactory balance
between the consumer's reasonable expectation of privacy and
the industry's need to collect, analyze, use and share information
about consumers.
The following list of issues is suggested by a consideration of
the Minnesota case, the legislative bills, the Modernization Act,
as well as two European documents. One is the Guidelines on the
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data issued by
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(Guidelines).184 The other is the European Union Directive on
Data Protection (Directive).18 As will be apparent from the dis-
cussion below, the Modernization Act deals with few of the issues
182. See supra text accompanying notes 59-127.
183. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, P.L. 106-102, 113
Stat. 1338 (1999). Unless otherwise indicated, references to the Modernization
Act are to Title V, Subtitle A (Disclosure of Nonpublic Personal Information).
184. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data (visited Jan.
31, 2000) <http://www.oecd.org/dsti/sti/it/secur/prod/PRIV-EN.HTM>
[hereinafter Guidelines].
185. See Swine & LITAN, supra note 6, at 213 (reproducing European
Union Directive on Data Protection) [hereinafter Directive].
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on the following list. While all of the issues on the list are impor-
tant, the mandates of the Directive are particularly crucial
because, unless the United States enacts privacy protections com-
parable to those of the Directive or otherwise reaches an accom-
modation with the European Union, companies in Europe will
not be permitted to share information with companies in the
United States.1 86
Among the issues which are relevant to consumer privacy
and therefore which Congress should consider are the following:
1) Should all companies be required to follow certain pri-
vacy practices or should the law be restricted to certain
industries such as financial institutions and the direct mar-
keting industry?
2) Consumer privacy likely attracted Congress' attention
largely because of the perceived heightened risks of con-
sumers engaging in e-commerce. Should new privacy laws
be restricted to those companies doing business with con-
sumers in e-commerce or should it apply to all consumer
transactions?
1 87
3) If companies are required to follow certain practices,
should those companies also be required to adopt a formal
privacy policy to implement the law's required practices?
4) If companies are required to follow required privacy
practices and adopt a privacy policy, should they be
required to publicize that policy by informing their cus-
tomers of the policy?' Should e-commerce companies be
required to post the policy on their Web sites?
5) Should legislation provide that failure by a business to
follow its privacy policy renders the company liable to gov-
ernment enforcement agencies and consumers?
186. See id. at vii.
187. The Guidelines and the Directive cover both non-electronic and
electronic commerce. See Guidelines, supra note 184; supra note 185, at art. 3.
They apply both to automated and nonautomated processing of consumer data.
The Guidelines justify the decision to include both types of commerce by
explaining that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the two; some
companies use mixed systems, and some companies might evade being subject
to the Guidelines' requirements by using nonautomated systems to process the
information they wanted to keep from the consumer. See, e.g., Citibank Corp.,
Your Privacy (visited Jan. 29, 2000) <http://www.citibank.com/privacy/pri-
vacy.htm> (containing general privacy policy and additional policy applicable
to Internet transactions).
188. The Directive requires disclosures to the "data subject" both when
the company collects information from the subject and when it obtains infor-
mation from another source. See Directive, supra note 185, at arts. 10-11.
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6) What types of information about consumers should the
law require a company to keep private?
18 9
7) Should the law require disclosure of a company's infor-
mation collection, use, and sharing? If the law does
require those disclosures, how detailed should the law be
in regard to those disclosures? Data collected for e-com-
merce transactions may be far more extensive than for
traditional purchases. For example, should the law require
a company to disclose whether the company uses cookies
or comparable devices?19 ° Should the statute require the
company to specifically list all the types of personally iden-
tifiable information it collects? Must the company detail
what types of transactional data it collects? Should disclo-
sure requirements vary depending upon whether or not
the information was collected from the consumer?'
8) Should the law require companies to provide consum-
ers with access to the information it has obtained about the
consumer?
19 2
9) Should the law permit the consumer to correct errone-
ous information and submit additional information to
make the company's data base more complete?19 3
10) Should the law require disclosure of whether or not
the company uses systems to ensure the security of trans-
189. The Guidelines subject "personal data" to its requirements. That
term is defined as "any information relating to an identified or identifiable indi-
vidual (data subject)." Guidelines, supra note 184. The Directive applies to
"personal data," which is defined as "any information relating to an identified
or identifiable natural person ... ; an identifiable person is one who can be
identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, physiological, mental,
economic, cultural or social identity." Directive, supra note 185, at art. 2(a).
190. Many sites voluntarily make this disclosure. See, e.g., Amazon.com,
Your Privacy (visited Jan. 21, 2000) <http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/
subst/misc/policy/privacy.html>; American Express Customer Internet Privacy State-
ment About Cookies (visitedJan. 31, 2000) <http://home3.americanexpress.com/
corp/consume rinfo/privacy/aboutc-ookies.asp>.
191. The Directive makes this distinction. See Directive, supra note 185, at
arts. 10-11.
192. The Guidelines provide consumers with access as part of its "Individ-
ual participation Principle." Guidelines, supra note 184. See also Directive, supra
note 185, at art. 12.
193. The Guidelines provide consumers with the right to challenge data
and have it "erased, rectified, completed or amended." Guidelines, supra note
184. The Directive also provides the consumer with the right to correct data.
See Directive, supra note 185, at art. 12(b).
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mission of data online and to authenticate transactions, sys-
tems such as SSL and SET?1 94
11) Should the law require that companies implement sys-
tems which assure adequate internal protection of con-
sumer information?1
9 5
12) Should a company be required to disclose, not only
that it shares information with affiliates and third parties,
but also list the types of business those affiliates and third
parties engage in?
13) Should the law require giving the consumer a choice
to opt-out of the company's information-sharing prac-
tice?19 6 Should the law require opt-in, where the company
could share its information with others only if the con-
sumer gave the company specific individualized permission
to do so after being fully informed of who would receive
the information, and for what purpose?
14) Should the law only restrict privacy practices where
the company shares information with third parties, and not
restrict sharing with affiliates?
15) If the law applies only to financial institutions, should
it restrict all information it shares with third parties? In the
alternative, should the law, like the Settlement in the Min-
nesota case, govern only information sharing with third
parties when they market non-financial services to consum-
ers? The rationale apparently is that information obtained
from or about consumers by the bank should be shared
only when used by third parties to market services compa-
194. Secure Socket Layer (SSL) technology ensures that only the
merchant with whom the customer is communicating over the Web has access
to the information being sent. See Marc Holt, How to Ensure Your Credit Card is
Secure in Cyberspace: Commonsense Goes a Long Way, BANGKOK POST, Jan. 26, 2000,
at 4, available in 2000 WL 4680757; Stuart McClure & Joel Scambray, Security
Watch: Hacking Frenzy Shows Network Security Breaches are not About to go out of Fash-
ion, INFOWORLD, Jan. 24, 2000, at 64, available in 2000 WL 8732439. Secure
Electronic Transactions (SET) is a technology developed by credit card compa-
nies which provides protection for transmission of credit card information. See
L.ssIG, supra note 8, at 40. The Guidelines provide that "[p]ersonal data
should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss
or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data."
Guidelines, supra note 184. The Directive contains detailed requirements in
regard to the security of systems. See Directive, supra note 185, at art. 17. See also
American Express, Security Q & A (visited Jan. 31, 2000) <http://
home4.americanexpress.com/cust-serv//docs/cs-security.shtml>.
195. The Guidelines contain such a provision. See Guidelines, supra note
184. The Directive also contains detailed requirements in this regard. See
Directive, supra note 185, at art. 17.
196. See Directive, supra note 185, at art. 17.
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rable to those the bank offered (financial services) when it
obtained the information from and about the consumer.
The assumption is the consumer's expectation of privacy is
only that the information will not be used for selling nonfi-
nancial purposes, but may be used, even by others, for sell-
ing financial services. Is that assumption about consumer
expectations reasonable?
16) Should the law establish a privacy agency to promul-
gate regulations pursuant to whatever statute is enacted?
19 7
Should an existing agency (i.e., the FTC, the FRB, or Com-
merce Department) be delegated that task?
17) Should consumers be given the right to sue for viola-
tions of the law, or should enforcement be left entirely to a
government agency?19 8 Instead of a government agency,
should all enforcement be left to consumer lawsuits?
B. The Financial Services Modernization Act
As a result of the growing public interest in consumer pri-
vacy, the Republican-controlled first session of the 106th Con-
gress experienced a flood of privacy bills.' 99 The privacy
provision which ultimately became law was contained in a most
unlikely piece of legislation. The Modernization Act2 ° restruc-
tures the entire financial services industry, permitting banks to
engage in types of businesses previously forbidden by merging
with insurance companies and brokerage firms. 20 ' Congress has
considered this restructuring for many years, and in the past con-
sumer privacy was never anywhere on the radar screen. In 1999,
however, the House Commerce Committee approved a version
of the bill which ultimately became the basis of the bill which
became law. That bill contained a remarkably strong privacy sec-
197. See id. at art. 28 (requiring each Member State to delegate to one or
more public authorities the responsibility for monitoring the application of the
Directive, conducting investigations, intervening, and bringing legal
proceedings).
198. Item #5 is far more limited than this item. Item #5 addresses only
the failure of a company to follow its privacy policy. This item would provide a
remedy for any violation of a consumer privacy statute and regulations, which
might include required notices, opt-out disclosures, security procedures, etc.
The Directive provides for enforcement actions by both individuals and govern-
ment agencies. See Directive, supra note 185, at arts. 22 & 28(3).
199. See infra text accompanying notes 314-47.
200. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
201. See At a Glance: Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12,
1999, at 4.
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tion.2 °2 The bill ultimately enacted is considerably weaker, but
given industry opposition, the fact it contained any privacy provi-
sion at all is notable. The enactment of the privacy provisions
demonstrates the extent to which the seriousness of consumer
privacy concerns have been successfully communicated to
Congress.
The description, analysis, and evaluation which follows raise
many issues. Some are fundamental, while others are technical
in nature. Many questions which arise because of holes and
ambiguities in the statute will be answered in forthcoming regu-
lations.2 0 3 But many questions undoubtedly will remain. More-
over, the discussion which follows should provide a basis for
judging the regulations.
The Modernization Act begins by making a bold and sweep-
ing policy statement. The Modernization Act states that it is Con-
gress' policy that financial institutions have "an affirmative and
continuing obligation to respect the privacy of their customers
and to protect the security and confidentiality of those custom-
ers' nonpublic personal information. ' 20 4 This policy statement
may guide agencies drafting regulations when deciding how
broadly to define terms20 5 and how extensively to expand exemp-
tions.2 1 It may influence courts interpreting the many vague
terms and provisions of the Modernization Act.
20 7
This policy is then effectuated in three principal ways. First,
each of the agencies or authorities with enforcement powers
under the Modernization Act is required to establish appropriate
standards relating to administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards:
(1) to insure the security and confidentiality of customer
records and information;
202. See Dean Anason, Privacy Issue Might Push Reform Bill Vote Past July 4,
AM. BANKER, June 24, 1999, at 2.
203. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 504.
204. Id. § 501(a). The Act becomes effective six months after regulations
are issued. See id. § 510. Regulations are to be promulgated six months after
the date of enactment. See id. § 504(3). Because the date of enactment was
Nov. 12, 1999, regulations must be issued by May 12, 1999, and the Act becomes
effective Nov. 12, 2000. The regulations, however, can specify that the Act will
become effective at a later date. See id. § 510.
205. For example, section 509(4) (B) requires the crucial term "publicly
available information" to be defined by regulation.
206. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 504(b).
207. See, e.g., id. § 509(4) (A) (iii) (providing that nonpublic personal
information includes "financial" information "otherwise obtained"). The Act
does not define either of the quoted terms.
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(2) to protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to
the security or integrity of such records; and
(3) to protect against unauthorized access to or use of such
records or information which could result in substantial
harm or inconvenience to any customer.
20 8
The second way in which congressional policy is effectuated
is by requiring the institution to disclose its privacy policy to
"consumers" with whom it has established a "customer relation-
ship" (the privacy policy disclosure). 209 Third, the institution
must notify the consumer before sharing nonpublic personal
information about the consumer to nonaffiliated third parties,
and must provide consumers the opportunity to opt-out of such
information sharing (opt-out notice).210 Institutions also are
prohibited from disclosing account numbers, access numbers
and access codes under many circumstances.2 1 1 Various federal
agencies are authorized to issue regulations applicable to the
institutions subject to their jurisdiction. 2 12 Those agencies are
empowered to enforce the Act and regulations issued pursuant
to it.2 13 There is no provision authorizing a private right of
action which would enable a consumer to sue for violation of the
Act.21 4 Finally, the Treasury Department is required to conduct a
study of information sharing among financial institutions' affili-
ates;2 15 those affiliates are exempted from the Act's notice and
opt-out requirements. 2 16 There also are numerous other excep-
208. Id. § 501(b).
209. Id. § 503.
210. See id. § 502.
211. See id. § 502(d). Other than disclosing these codes and numbers to
consumer reporting agencies, institutions may not disclose this information "to
any nonaffiliated third party for use in telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or
other marketing through electronic mail to the consumer." Id.
212. See id. § 504. See also Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 65
Fed. Reg. 8770 (2000) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pts. 40, 216, 332, 573 (pro-
posed Feb. 22, 2000)) (regulations proposed by the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency, the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision) [hereinafter Proposed
Regulations].
213. See Gramm-Leach-Riley Financial Modernization Act § 505.
214. However, state attorneys general and consumers may be able to sue
pursuant to state unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes and the common
law. See David W. Roderer, Privacy Provisions of New Financial Services Law Likely to
Ensnare the Unwary, 73 BANKING REP. (BNA) 854, 855 (1999).
215. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 508.
216. The opt-out notice provisions of section 502 only apply to nonaf-
filiated third parties, a term which does not include a financial institution's
affiliates. Id. § 509(5).
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tions and exemptions.
217
While industry hailed the Modernization Act for providing
important and far-reaching protection for consumers, 18 others,
including President Clinton, decried what they claimed were sub-
stantial weaknesses in those provisions. 219 The criticism was not
confined to the "usual suspects," the privacy advocates who
would be expected to criticize any law which failed to provide
very expansive consumer privacy protection. 220 Others also ques-
tioned the effectiveness of the law.22 ' For example, columnist
Jane Bryant Quinn condemned the law in the strongest terms.
"Privacy. Consumers lost it all ... You've been sold out. '22 2 A
detailed analysis of the Modernization Act reveals that while con-
sumers did not lose everything, they did not receive anywhere
near the safeguards which they need to be adequately protected.
Crucial to understanding the scope of the provisions of the
Modernization Act is the statute's definitions of key terms. The
Modernization Act makes a major distinction between nonaf-
filiated third parties and affiliates, exempting affiliates from its
restrictions on information sharing. The terms "affiliate" and
"nonaffiliated third-party" are defined in the Modernizaion Act,
largely based on whether one company controls another.
223
217. See, e.g., id. at § 502(e).
218. The Consumer Bankers Association "hailed" the Act and proclaimed
it to be pro-consumer. See Financial Modernization Crosses the Finish Line, CBA
REP., Nov. 1, 1999, at 1, available in 1999 WL 20345608.
219. See Roderer, supra note 214, at 854 (President Clinton stated: "I do
not believe that the privacy provisions go far enough.").
220. See Ed Mierzwinski, New Bank Laws May Increase Threats to Consumers'
Privacy, 15 U.S. PIRG 4, Fall 1999 (stating that the Act "may have made things
worse," and deeming the opt-out provision "meaningless").
221. See, e.g., William Safire, Privacy Fire Walls About to Tumble, ATLANTA
J.CONST., Nov. 2, 1999, at A13 (criticizing law for failure to provide protection
from affiliate information sharing); Schroeder, supra note 38, at A50 ("A
diverse group of critics including consumer activist Ralph Nader, conservative
Phyllis Schlafly, AARP, and a number of conservative Republicans and liberal
Democrats in the House and Senate" opposed the bill's exclusion of affiliates
from the privacy protection afforded against nonaffiliated third parties. None-
theless, the exclusion was retained in the law as enacted).
222. Jane Bryant Quinn, The Megabucks Marts Arrive, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8,
1999, at 52; see also Roderer, supra note 214.
223. A nonaffiliated third party means an entity that is not an affiliate of
the financial institution, and an entity that is not "related by common owner-
ship or affiliated by corporate control with . . . the financial institution."
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 509(5). An "affiliate" is
.any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with
another company." Id. § 509(6). This definition is similar to that used in the
Fair Credit Reporting Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d) (2) (A) (iii) (1999) ("related
by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control").
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The Modernization Act differentiates between the "con-
sumer" and the consumer with whom the institution "estab-
lish[es] a customer relationship." '224 The provisions requiring
the opt-out notice apply to the consumer. "Consumer" is
defined in the same manner as it is defined in other federal con-
sumer protection statutes.2 5 The section requiring the privacy
policy disclosure applies to the consumer with a customer rela-
tionship. The Modernization Act does not define "customer" or
a "customer relationship. 226 Perhaps what Congress intended
was to distinguish persons who obtain products or services only
one time or occasionally, from persons who have an ongoing
relationship. Examples of the former might be a person who
occasionally uses an ATM owned and operated by a bank with
whom the person has no account. Or a person who occasionally
cashes a check at a bank with whom the person does not have an
account. Examples of the latter would be a person who has a
savings or checking account at a bank, obtained a loan from the
bank, or uses a credit card issued by the bank. This interpreta-
tion is implied from the use of the word "relationship." In addi-
tion, the privacy policy disclosure must be made to the consumer
annually. It would impose an unfair burden on the institution to
have to make this disclosure to one-shot users or persons occa-
sionally using its services or products. It would be very expensive
and require the institution to get the address of every consumer
who uses any product or service. On the other hand, the institu-
tion has the address of persons who have accounts with it.
Finally, this interpretation is supported by the Modernizations
Act's requiring the privacy policy disclosure to include policies
and practices in regard to "persons who have ceased to be cus-
tomers of the financial institution." '227 This implies that a cus-
tomer with a relationship includes a temporal component, a
consumer who has had an ongoing, continuing relationship.
224. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(a).
225. "The term 'consumer' means an individual who obtains, from a
financial institution, financial products or services which are to be used primar-
ily for personal, family, or household purposes, and also means the legal repre-
sentative of such an individual." Id. § 509(9).
226. Another portion of the Act, dealing with fraudulent access to finan-
cial information, defines "customer" as "any person (or authorized representa-
tive of a person) to whom the financial institution provides a product or service,
including that of acting as a fiduciary." Id. § 527(1). This definition does noth-
ing to further an understanding of the difference in the privacy section of the
Modernization Act between a consumer and a consumer who is also a
customer.
227. Id. § 503(a) (2).
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The Modernization Act restricts an institution's sharing of
"nonpublic personal information," which means "personally
identifiable financial information (i) provided by a consumer to
a financial institution; (ii) resulting from any transaction with the
consumer or any service performed for the consumer; or (iii)
otherwise obtained by the financial institution." 22 8 The term
therefore includes what is referred to as "data privacy" as well as
"transaction privacy. '229 Use of the phrase "otherwise obtained"
seems to cast a wide net, meant to include all information which
comes within the definition of nonpublic personal information.
Examples which might come within this category are information
obtained from credit reporting agencies and from companies
which gather data about the consumers who view the advertise-
ments which financial institutions have on their Web sites.2 3 °
The only information which is protected, however, is "financial
information. ' 2 '1 Although the term is not defined in the Mod-
ernization Act, it would not include "nonfinancial demographic
data or depersonalized information used by a bank or business
for analytical purposes. "232 "Nonpublic personal information"
must be distinguished from "publicly available information."
The Modernization Act does not restrict an institution's sharing
of publicly available information. Obviously, the definition of
publicly available information therefore is very important.
Unfortunately, the term "publicly available information" is not
defined; instead, it is to be defined by regulations issued under
the statute.2 3 Nevertheless, the Modernization Act does provide
228. Id. § 509(4).
229. CARAT GUIDELINES, GUIDELINES FOR CONSTRUCTING POLICIES GOV-
ERNING THE USE OF IDENTITY-BASED PUBLIC KEY CERTIFICATES 95 (Sept. 1999)
[hereinafter CARAT GUIDELINES]. See also Richard Fischer & Clarke Dryden
Camper, Reform Law and Privacy: A Road Map, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 6.
Data privacy refers to personal information about a consumer, such as his Social
Security number, address, and age. Transactional privacy refers to information
about a consumer's business transactions such as the stores where the con-
sumer shops and what items the consumer purchases. The CARAT guidelines,
developed by the National Automated Clearing House Association's Internet
Council Certification Authority Rating and Trust Task Force, also defines trans-
actional privacy as information that a subject may not realize is being collected
about himself. See CARAT GUIDELINES, supra. The guidelines state that the
subject has the same expectation of privacy regardless of whether the subject
knowingly provides data to an entity or the information is collected without his
knowledge. See id.
230. See Alan Zeichick, Ad Serving Explained, RED HERRING, Jan. 2000, at
216-17.
231. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 509(4)(A).
232. Fischer & Camper, supra note 229, at 6.
233. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 509(4)(B).
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that some types of publicly available information are included
within the meaning of nonpublic personal information.234
A major limitation of the Modernization Act is its applica-
tion only to financial institutions2 5 and other persons and enti-
ties who are involved in information sharing directly or indirectly
related to nonpublic information possessed by the financial insti-
tution.236 Therefore, it imposes no duties upon Web businesses
that are not themselves financial institutions as defined by the
Modernization Act or that do not share information with finan-
cial institutions. The Modernization Act does include a broad
definition of "financial institution," however, which includes not
only traditional depository institutions such as banks, but also
broker-dealers, investment companies, investment advisers, and
insurance companies.23 7 Moreover, its coverage may also include
businesses which do not come within the common understand-
ing of what constitutes a financial institution. 238
Despite the broad definition of financial institution, it may
nevertheless be underinclusive given the overlapping nature of e-
commerce, which often involves financial institutions and other
businesses. For example, a consumer may engage in home bank-
234. Nonpublic personal information includes "any list, description, or
other grouping of consumers (and publicly available information pertaining to
them) that is derived using any personally identifiable information other than
publicly available information." Id. § 509(4) (C) (i).
235. The Act defines "financial institution" as "any institution the busi-
ness of which is engaging in financial activities or activities that are incidental to
financial activities, as described in section 4(k) of the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956." Id. § 509(3) (A). The term does not include persons or entities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the
Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation, or any entity chartered under the
Farm Credit Act of 1971, or institutions chartered by Congress to engage in
transactions described in section 502(e)(1)(C) of the Modernization Act, as
long as they do not sell or transfer nonpublic personal information to a nonaf-
filiated third party. See id. §§ 509(3) (B)-502(e) (1) (C). Section 502(e) (1) (C)
applies to secondary market institutions.
236. For example, the Modernization Act also applies to nonaffiliated
third parties with whom the financial institution shares information. See id.
§ 502(d) (stating that a financial institution may not disclose account number
information for marketing purposes to nonaffiliated third parties). In addition,
restrictions are placed on these third parties sharing with "fourth parties." See
id. § 502(c) (restricting the reuse of information by third parties).
237. See id. § 509(3) (A); Privacy and the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, KPMG
Memorandum (Nov 12, 1999) (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter
KPMG Memorandum]. Under certain circumstances it also may include travel
agents and automobile dealers. See Roderer, supra note 214, at 855.
238. "This definition [of financial institution] could include . . . a
merchant or manufacturer that extends credit or a nonbank that issues stored
value cards or sells money orders." Fischer & Camper, supra note 229, at 6.
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ing from her PC, transferring funds from her savings account to
her checking account. At the same sitting she may use the bank's
electronic bill-paying service to pay bills resulting from transac-
tions with both Web-based and bricks-and-mortar stores, which
she charges on her present credit card account. After paying
those bills she may apply for an additional credit card from the
bank. Immediately thereafter, she may use her credit card
account to purchase items from Web sellers. The consumers'
privacy concerns and expectations in regard to her credit card
account will not be significantly different whether she is con-
ducting transactions with a financial institution or with the Web
sellers. Nevertheless, presumably the Web seller is not consid-
ered a financial institution unless that seller has itself issued the
credit card.239
As discussed below,240 it is expected that many states will
enact privacy laws to expand the coverage of privacy protection
beyond the scope of the Modernization Act. That may result in
state laws which include non-financial institutions. If that hap-
pens, the industry likely will urge Congress to enact a new law or
an amendment to the Modernization Act to cover non-financial
institutions and to preempt state law. Presumably, industry will
urge language more limited in scope than what states have
enacted. Even if it is not more limited than state law, it will be
advantageous to industry in being uniform nationally, rather
than the variation which occurs when each state enacts its own
version. If Congress enacts legislation to cover non-financial
institutions, the possibility arises that this legislation could
impose obligations upon non-financial institutions and provide
protections to consumers which are different from those in the
Modernization Act. This would result in confusion for consum-
ers as they receive different disclosures and notices depending
on with which type of business they are dealing.
In addition, consumers may confuse the protections of one
law with those of another law, believing they have more protec-
tion than they actually have, and engaging in transactions they
otherwise would avoid. This confusion has already occurred in
regard to debit cards. The law provides consumers with far less
protection for debit cards than for credit cards, 241 but consumers
239. Cf id. (opining that a merchant who extends credit may be consid-
ered a financial institution under the Modernization Act).
240. See text infra accompanying note 301.
241. For example, the maximum consumer liability for unauthorized use
of a credit card is $50. See 15 U.S.C. § 1643(a) (1) (B) (1994). The liability for
debit cards ranges from $50 to whatever amount the consumer has in her
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do not understand the difference.2 4 2 On the other hand, the
confusion caused by having two different laws may lead consum-
ers to wrongly believe they have less protection for debit cards
than the law actually provides. As a result, consumers may avoid
transactions they would willingly enter into if they realized they
were protected.
Turning from the scope of the Modernization Act to its sub-
stance, the Modernization Act requires a privacy policy disclo-
sure. Financial institutions must disclose their "policies and
practices" in regard to certain matters.2 4 3 In using that phrase,
the Modernization Act recognizes that there is a difference
between an institution's policies and its practices. Whereas a
"policy" is "a principle or course of action chosen to guide deci-
sionmaking,"2 44 a "practice" is the "[a]ctual performance.
245
This requirement should be viewed in connection with another
section of the Modernization Act which requires enforcement
agencies to establish standards for institutions which "insure the
security and confidentiality of customer records and
information. "246
The Modernization Act requires the institution to inform
consumers with whom it has established a customer relationship
of its policies and practices in regard to the following:
1) disclosing nonpublic personal information to affiliates
and nonaffiliated third parties, consistent with section 502,
including the categories of information that may be
disclosed;
2) disclosing nonpublic personal information of persons
who have ceased to be customers of the financial institu-
tion; and
3) protecting the nonpublic personal information of
consumers.
24 7
This privacy policy disclosure requirement is limited to disclosure
of policies and practices in regard to nonpublic personal infor-
account, depending upon when the consumer notifies the card issuer. See 15
U.S.C. § 1693(g) (1994).
242. See Debit Cards Still Confuse Many Consumers, PALM BEACH POST, Mar.
15, 1999, at 15 (reporting on a survey by the National Consumers League which
showed that consumers did not understand their liability when using debit
cards).
243. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 503(a).
244. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE DIcrIoNARY 540 (1984).
245. Id. at 548.
246. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 501(b) (1).
247. Id. § 503(a). The reference to § 502 is to the section that requires
notice of sharing with third parties and opportunity to opt-out.
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mation. As noted above, 248 this presents problems of application
because the Modernization Act contains no definition of "public
personal information." Whereas the Modernization Act contains
a major loophole in exempting sharing information with affili-
ates from the notice and opt-out requirements of section 502, the
privacy policy disclosure provision requires the institution to dis-
close its policies, not only in regard to sharing information with
nonaffiliated third parties, but also with its own affiliates. The
disclosure must be made "[a]t the time of establishing a cus-
tomer relationship with the consumer."2 49 The apparent objec-
tive of requiring disclosure at this early time is to ensure that the
customer is alerted to the risk to his privacy at a meaningful time.
The consumer who objects to the institution's policies and prac-
tices of sharing information with affiliates could avoid having
information about himself shared with non-affiliates by refusing
to do business with the institution before any information is
shared. The Modernization Act requires the institution to
inform the consumer of its policies and practices, not only while
the consumer is a customer of the institution, but also after the
consumer is no longer a customer of the institution. This is a
significant provision because it is likely that at the beginning of a
relationship with an institution many consumers would not think
about what may happen to personal information when the con-
sumer's relationship with the firm has terminated.
The disclosures must describe both the "categories of per-
sons to whom information is or may be disclosed, ' 25 0 and "the
categories of nonpublic information that are collected by the
financial information."251 Consumers would receive a more
informative disclosure if the Modernization Act required the
institution to provide the names of the persons or entities to
whom information is disclosed and to describe the nonpublic
information that it collects, rather than merely listing categories.
To require that, however, would present problems if the law also
required the institution to notify the customer whenever there
was a change in the information disclosed. Since the institution
must notify the customer annually, however, the law could
248. See supra text accompanying note 232.
249. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 503(a). The dis-
closure must also be given at least annually thereafter. See id. See also Proposed
Regulations, supra note 212, at 8775 (requiring that notice be provided prior to
the time a customer relationship is established).
250. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 503(b)(1)(A).
251. Id. § 503(b)(2). See also Proposed Regulations, supra note 211, at
8776 (providing that information can be categorized according to source and
giving examples).
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require that once a year the institution compile a list of compa-
nies to whom it may disclose information and a list of the specific
nonpublic information it collects. The disclosure to the cus-
tomer would explain that the list may not be entirely accurate
because it is updated only once each year. Such a requirement
would give the customer the information she needs without
unduly burdening the institution. At the very least, the institu-
tion should be required to name the affiliates with whom it
shares information. Because the term "categories" is not defined
in the Modernization Act, regulations may provide a definition.
The requirement of describing categories will be practically
meaningless if an institution, for example, can describe catego-
ries of persons to whom information may be disclosed merely as
"affiliates of the institution who sell insurance products." The
consumer needs to know that the financial institution will share
information with affiliate XYZ Insurance Company which is in
the business of selling life health insurance. That type of disclo-
sure will alert the consumer who has life, disability, or health
insurance from XYZ Insurance Company that if she requests a
loan from the financial institution, its insurance affiliate may
share medical information it has collected about the consumer.
Finally, the institution must disclose how it protects its non-
public personal information. Although not absolutely clear, that
requirement most likely is explained by a provision later in the
section which states that the required disclosures must include
"the policies that the institution maintains to protect the confi-
dentiality and security of nonpublic personal information." '252
The requirement thus refers to both privacy safeguards and the
closely related area of security.25 3 Banks already make disclo-
sures which may satisfy some of the Modernization Act's require-
ments. For example, U.S. Bancorp used to inform consumers
that all of its employees must follow a Code of Ethics under
which they must keep customer information confidential, an
obligation which continued even after they no longer worked at
252. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 503(b) (3). See
also Proposed Regulations, supra note 212, at 8777-78 (stating that the institu-
tion can satisfy the confidentiality and security requirements by explaing who
has access and how they may obtain access).
253. See Roderer, supra note 214, at 855 ("[U]nheeded by most is the
persistent reference to security throughout the title as a separate and equal
value under the new law. The regulatory and ultimately legal standards for
security to which financial institutions might be held accountable will likely
only unfold in time-and through litigation.").
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the bank.25 4 U.S. Bancorp also notifies customers of their secur-
ity measures.
2 55
Requiring the institution to disclose its policies and practices
presents risks for the institution. It must be sure its disclosures
accurately state its policies and practices or it may encounter dif-
ficulties similar to those U.S. Bank faced in Minnesota. This may
require monitoring the conduct of its employees to ascertain
what their actual practices are. If the institution changes its poli-
cies and practices, it must be sure those changes are accurately
reflected in its disclosures. The Modernization Act does not spell
out the institution's duties when it adopts such changes. For
example, it is not clear whether the institution is required to
promptly notify all of its customers of the changes, or whether it
can wait until the mandated annual notice to do so.
The disclosure of privacy policy must be "clear and conspicu-
ous," and the institution can provide the required disclosure
either in writing or in electronic form.2 5 6 In case there may be
some other acceptable manner of providing notice that Congress
had not thought of, the Modernization Act gives federal agencies
the authority to issue regulations which permit notice in other
formats. This raises the possibility that regulations could allow
notice to be made orally. Oral notice is problematic. If the insti-
tution chooses that alternative, it is inviting claims by consumers
that the disclosures were never made, or that they were not made
clearly and conspicuously. The allowance of electronic notice
also is problematic. For example, could an institution make elec-
tronic disclosures even if the consumer was not informed that
the institution had chosen that method, and even if the con-
sumer did not agree to that form of disclosure?2 5 7 Could the
254. The bank's privacy page was revised to state instead, "Employees'
access is restricted to their need to know such information for business reasons.
All employees are trained to respect customer privacy, and those who violate
our Privacy Pledge will be subject to discipline." USBancorp, US Bankcorp Pri-
vacy Policy (visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.usbank.com/privacy.html>.
255. The bank uses Secure Sockets Layer to encrypt transmissions. See id.
256. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 503(a). See
also Proposed Regulations, supra note 212, at 8771 (defining clear and conspic-
uous); Will Roger, Privacy Isn't Public Knowledge: Online Policies Spread Confusion
With Legal Jargon, USA TODAY, May 1, 2000, at 3D (stating many sites' privacy
policies are difficult to understand).
257. See, e.g., 63 Fed. Reg. 14548 (1998) (proposed March 25, 1998, pro-
posing a rule amending Reg. Z to permit creditors to use electronic communi-
cation). See also Proposed Regulations, supra note 212, at 8775 (stating that oral
notice alone is not sufficient and permitting notice via electronic mail to a con-
sumer who obtains financial products or services electronically and notice on a
Web page if the consumer is in the process of conducting a transaction over the
Internet).
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institution choose that method even it had no reason to believe
the consumer owned or had access to a computer? Even if the
institution obtained a signed agreement from the consumer con-
senting to electronic disclosure, the institution would have to be
careful to maintain systems capable of proving to regulatory
authorities and others who might challenge the institution's
compliance that the mandates of the Modernization Act had
been followed in regard to the timing and contents of the notice.
The Modernizatin Act seems to require agencies to issue regula-
tions pursuant to the section containing the disclosure provi-
sions."' Hopefully, those regulations will answer the preceding
questions.
In addition to requiring the disclosure of the institution's
privacy policy, the Modernization Act requires the institution to
provide a notice to the consumer prior to sharing information,
either directly or through an affiliate, with unaffiliated third par-
ties.2 5 9  The information must "clearly and conspicuously"
inform the consumer that nonpublic personal information may
be disclosed to "such third party."2 6 By using this latter lan-
guage rather than merely requiring the disclosure of categories
of persons as is required for the privacy policy disclosure, 26 1 the
Modernizatin Act seems to require the institution to specifically
name the third party, rather than merely notify the consumer of
the type of third parties, for example, telemarketers, with whom
information would be shared.2 62 The notice may be either in
writing or in electronic form or other form allowed by regula-
tion, raising the same issues as discussed above in regard to the
privacy policy disclosure.2 63
In addition to informing the consumer that it may share
nonpublic personal information with nonaffiliated third parties,
the institution also must give the consumer the opportunity "to
direct" that the information not be disclosed to the third
party.264 In the parlance of privacy protection, this is known as
an "opt-out." The institution must provide the opt-out before it
258. Section 503(a) provides: "Such disclosures shall be made in accord-
ance with the regulations prescribed under section 504." Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Financial Modernization Act § 503(a).
259. See id. § 502(a).
260. Id. §502(b)(1)(A).
261. See id. at § 503(b) (1) (A).
262. Contrast the language of section 503(b)(1)(A), which requires
merely the disclosure of the "categories of persons to whom the information is
or may be disclosed." But see Proposed Regulations, supra note 211, at 8778
(permitting the institution to identify categories).
263. See supra text accompanying note 256.
264. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(b)(1)(B).
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initially discloses nonpublic personal information. In addition,
the institution must explain to the consumer how she can exer-
cise the nondisclosure option.265 The Modernization Act does
not contain any specifics on how the consumer can opt-out. The
question arises whether the method of opt-out is entirely up to
the institution. If the institution can choose any method it wants,
it could require the consumer to opt-out by sending an e-mail
message to the institution. This would be unfair if the consumer
did not have access to e-mail. Even if the consumer has access to
e-mail, she may prefer to exercise the option in writing and send
it by mail. The Modernization Act does not indicate whether she
would be able to do so, regardless of whether the institution
sought to require opt-out only via e-mail.
Whereas the disclosure of the institution's privacy policy
must be provided annually,266 there is no such explicit require-
ment for the opt-out notice. That raises the issue of whether the
institution can impose a time limit on the consumer's ability to
opt out, after which the consumer forever loses her ability to ever
opt-out.
26 7
The significance of certain portions of the Modernization
Act can be better understood when they are contrasted with the
Settlement between U.S. Bank and Minnesota. The scope of the
Modernization Act is broader than the Minnesota Settlement in
applying to all types of third parties, including those selling
financial products. 268 It is narrower than the Settlement, how-
ever, in not prohibiting the sharing of information with third
parties, 269 but merely requiring disclosure and the opportunity
to opt-out. Therefore, financial institutions could continue to
share information with third parties selling nonfinancial prod-
ucts, but only after consumers are fully informed that would be
done and the consumers failed to opt-out. Arguably, having
been informed and not opting-out, the consumer no longer has
an expectation of privacy in regard to that sharing. Privacy advo-
265. See id. §502(b)(1)(C).
266. See id. § 503(a).
267. "A colloquy between Sens. Phil Gramm and Michael Crapo during
Senate consideration of the bill confirms that this notice and opt-out opportu-
nity only has to be given once; in other words, it does not have to be provided
separately for each disclosure of covered information or for each nonaffiliated
entity to which such information may be provided." Fischer & Camper, supra
note 229, at 6. See also Proposed Regulations, supra note 212, at 8778 (stating
that the consumer always has the right to opt-out).
268. The Minnesota Settlement applies only to unaffiliated third parties
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cates, however, favor an opt-in procedure as necessary to ensure
consumers truly intend to surrender their privacy.2 70 Failure to
opt-out is passive; the consumer may not have paid attention to
the disclosure, may have intended to opt out but forgot to, may
have a limited understanding of English, etc. If the forthcoming
regulations allow the institution to require the consumer to exer-
cise opt-out by sending an electronic message, the meaningful-
ness of the option is even more doubtful. Opt-in requires an
affirmative act, providing much stronger proof of the consumer's
actual intention not to protect her privacy.
The Settlement provides that if the consumer exercises the
option to opt-out, the bank must remove his name from the lists
it provides to third parties." 1 The Modernization Act is silent,
merely requiring the consumer to "direct" that the information
not be disclosed to third parties, but not saying what the bank is
required to do when the consumer exercises his option. In addi-
tion, although the law requires the bank to explain to consumers
how they can exercise opt-out, it does not provide any standards
or procedures. For example, can the bank require that the con-
sumer's opt-out be in writing, or be in electronic form if the
bank's disclosure is in electronic form? Can the bank require the
consumer to exercise opt-out within five business days or forever
relinquish his right to opt-out? The Modernization Act does,
however, provide for the situation where the consumer does not
exercise opt-out, the information is consequently shared with a
third party, and the third party in turn shares it with a "fourth"
party. The third party may not disclose nonpublic personal
information to a "fourth" party unless that disclosure would be
lawful if the financial institution had made the disclosure directly
to the "fourth" party.
2 72
The scope of the Modernization Act also is narrower than
the Settlement in excluding from coverage under the opt-out
section an institution sharing information with its affiliates. The
Settlement provides that the consumer can opt out of the bank's
270. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 508(a) (8)
(directing federal agencies to conduct a study, inter alia, of the feasibility of an
opt-in procedure); Sovern, supra note 5, at 1074-78 (describing problems con-
sumers have had opting out of mailing lists); Lisa Fickenscher, States Expected to
Tighten Reform's Privacy Provisions, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 11; Richard
Wolf, Privacy is a Priority With Voters, State Legislators Say, USA TODAY, Jan. 19,
2000, at A3 (reporting that privacy proponents advocate giving consumers con-
trol, while bankers claim opt-in would be disastrous because consumers will not
take the time to opt-in).
271. See Settlement, supra note 107, at 20.
272. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(c). The
third party's affiliate is subject to the same restriction. See id.
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sharing information with affiliates. 273 Whether or not to include
affiliates in the Modernization Act's coverage was a major point
of contention. The House Commerce Committee's bill had
included affiliates.274 Small banks contended that, if privacy leg-
islation were enacted, it should include affiliates in order to
ensure a level playing field. 27 5 According to the smaller banks,
they have to use third parties to perform many operations,
whereas the big banks have affiliates for many tasks. Therefore,
the big banks would seldom or never have to comply with the
statute's restrictions on sharing with third parties, whereas the
smaller banks would constantly be subject to it. The larger banks
won that battle, contending that the ability to cross-sell products
from affiliate to affiliate was often a primary objective in a
merger among different types of financial institutions.276
The Modernization Act contains significant exceptions to its
third party notice requirements. The disclosure of nonpublic
personal information is not prohibited if it is "necessary to effect,
administer, or enforce a transaction requested or authorized by
the consumer."277 The disclosure of such information also is not
prohibited if the consumer consents to it.27 s It is not clear what
might constitute consent which meets the requirements of the
Modernization Act. Institutions might be tempted to insert con-
sent clauses into agreements in a format unlikely to be noticed
and phrased in legalese. These should not pass muster. It has
been suggested that the institution must obtain "informed con-
sent" and "a clear and conspicuous notice of such sharing above
a signature line" would be sufficient.279 In addition, disclosure is
not prohibited if it is necessary to administer a transaction, or to
273. See Settlement, supra note 107, at 20.
274. See Anason, supra note 202, at 2.
275. See Dean Anason, Gramm: Privacy Safeguards May be Essential Conces-
sion for Financial Reform Passage, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5, 1999, at 2 (Senator Gramm
opposed excluding affiliates which would give diversified holding companies a
competitive advantage over community banks); Stephen Labaton, Lawmakers
Reject Clinton Changes to Finance-Overhaul Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1999, at 13
(house defeats Congressman Markey's amendment to apply the third party
notice to affiliates); Norbert McCrady, Personal Data Firewall Remains an Illusion,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 3, 1999, at 6 (opining that excluding affiliates puts small
banks at an unfair disadvantage); Schroeder, supra note 38, at A50 (Republican
Senator Richard Shelby sponsored an unsuccessful amendment to apply the
third party notice to affiliates).
276. See Schroeder, supra note 38, at A50.
277. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502 (e) (1). This
sweeping exclusion is defined at great length. See id. § 509(7).
278. See id. § 502(e) (2).
279. See L. Richard Fisher & Clarke Dryden Camper, Exceptions to Reform's
Privacy Obligation, AM. BANKER, Dec. 3, 1999, at 8.
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service or process a product or service.28 ° Although sharing
information with third parties who service or process a product
or service is permitted, those third parties must comply with the
information confidentiality requirements which apply to the
institution for which it is doing the servicing or processing.2"'
Disclosure is allowed when its purpose is to protect the confiden-
tiality or security of the institution's records, to protect against
fraud, for risk control or to resolve consumer disputes or inquir-
ies.2 82 Information may be disclosed to insurance rate advisory
organizations,28 3 credit reporting agencies,28 4 and to a person
acting as the fiduciary of the consumer.285 Disclosure may also
be made to law enforcement agencies.286 The third party disclo-
sures need not be made in connection with maintaining a con-
sumer's account with another entity as part of a private label
credit card program or any other credit extension of credit on
behalf of that entity.
287
There are sound reasons for many of these exceptions. The
problem is that the statute does not require the institution to
disclose those exceptions to the consumer. As a result, absent
regulatory action, the institution may make the required disclo-
sures to consumers informing them of the institution's privacy
policy, describing how generally the information will be kept
confidential, may make the required third party notice, but then
add the standard phrase, "except where otherwise permitted or
required by law." The consumer will have no inkling how exten-
sive the exceptions are unless they are described in the notice.
As an alternative, in the notice, the institution could inform the
consumer that there are many exceptions allowed by law and
provide the consumer with an easy method for obtaining a
detailed description of those exceptions.
There also are exceptions which apply specifically to the opt-
out provision. The opt-out provision does not prevent an institu-
280. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(e) (1).
This would apply to third parties which process or administer pay which are
made by consumers paying by check, credit card, or debit card.
281. See Fisher & Camper, supra note 280, at 8.
282. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(e) (3).
283. See id. § 502(e) (4).
284. See id. § 502(e) (6) (A).
285. See id. § 502(e) (3) (E).
286. See id. § 502(e) (8).
287. See id. § 502(e) (1) (B). This exception was inserted "without a full
conference-committee debate... The exemption applies to retailers who offer
credit cards issued and serviced by third-party firms, such as GE Capital and
Household International, Inc." Michael Schroeder, Congress Passes Financial-
Services Bill, WALL ST. J., Nov. 5, 1999, at A2.
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tion from sharing information with a nonaffiliated third party
where that party performs functions for the institution or func-
tions on behalf of the institution. 288 Consequently, a third party
can use the institution's information about consumers to market
the financial institution's own products or services. In addition,
a third party can perform services for two or more institutions
pursuant to joint agreements between the institutions as long as
each institution "fully discloses" that it is providing information
to the third party.
289
The types of entities excepted under these provisions of the
Modernization Act may actually increase beyond those listed in
the statute. The federal banking agencies are authorized to pro-
mulgate regulations. 290 While this provides the opportunity for
filling in the holes discussed above, the Modernization Act also
permits the regulations to include additional exceptions which
are "deemed consistent with the purposes" of the law. 291 That is
a rather vague standard, and the industry may be expected to try
to gain further exceptions to ameliorate the effect of the law.
Therefore, absent regulatory clarification, there will be great
uncertainty regarding the scope of the statute.
A statute is not worth the paper it is printed on unless it
provides an effective means for enforcing its provisions. The
Modernization Act contains a major defect in regard to enforce-
ment. Federal and state agencies are given the authority to
enforce the statute. 292 Banks are subject to enforcement by the
agency having jurisdiction over them. Financial institutions not
subject to the jurisdiction of any other agency are subject to
enforcement by the Federal Trade Commission. Federal and
state consumer protection laws recognize that there is no way
that government agencies can possibly enforce these laws effec-
tively, given their many other enforcement duties, their need to
288. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(b)(2).
289. Id. § 502(b)(2). The institution is required to enter into an agree-
ment with the third party requiring that party to keep the information confi-
dential. "Joint agreement" is defined in section 509(10). This provision
"address[es] a potential imbalance between the treatment of large financial
services conglomerates and small banks or credit unions." Roderer, supra note
214, at 854-55. It has been suggested that the "fully discloses" language means
the disclosure must conform to the "clear and conspicuous" requirement of
section 502(b) (1) (A). See Fisher & Camper, supra note 280, at 8.
290. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 504(a).
291. Id. § 504(b).
292. See id. § 505(a).
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prioritize, and limited resources.293 In addition, they are subject
to congressional pressures which influence their setting of priori-
ties. 29 4 Therefore, these laws provide for a private right of action
so consumers can sue. 295 Moreover, they contain provisions for
statutory damages, attorney's fees, and class actions in order to
encourage consumers to act as "private attorneys general."
2 96
The Modernization Act, however, does not authorize a private
right of action for consumers. Consumers, consequently, are
unable to sue directly for violation of the statute. They may, nev-
ertheless, be able to sue under statutes such as state Unfair and
Deceptive Practice laws, arguing that a violation of the federal
privacy law is an unfair or deceptive practice.29 7 That avenue
does not afford consumers with as effective a remedy as a private
right of action under the Modernization Act, however, because
many state UDAP statutes contain various types of restrictions
and limitations which place obstacles in the way of consumer's
seeking redress.298
The industry's successful effort to restrict the reach of the
Modernization Act's privacy provisions may backfire. The Mod-
ernization Act provides that it preempts only state law that is
inconsistent, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
299
In addition, a state law is not considered inconsistent if the FTC
determines that it provides consumers with greater protection
293. See Complaints Rise, But Not Complaint Agency Budgets, CFA NEws, Dec.
1999-Jan. 2000, at 4 (stating that complaints to state and local consumer agen-
cies rose 49% from 1996 to 1998, but agencies had the same budgets).
294. See generally Mark E. Budnitz, The FTC's Consumer Protection Program
During the Miller Years: Lessons for Administrative Agency Structure and Operation, 46
CATH. U. L. Rv. 371 (1997).
295. See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1998).
296. Id. See also Kronebusch v. MVBA Harvestore Sys., 488 N.W.2d 490
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing recovery of costs and attorney's fees for viola-
tion of statute prohibiting misleading advertising in order to encourage lawyers
to bring cases where nominal damages would otherwise preclude such actions);
JONATHAN SHELDON & CAROLYN L. CARTER, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE AcTs AND
PRAcTICEs 513-82 (4th ed. 1997) (discussing consumer remedies under state
unfair and deceptive trade practice laws); Emily Heller, Junk Fax Ads Irritate Con-
sumers but May Yield WindfallforLawyers, FULTON Co. DAILY REP.,Jan. 12, 2000, at
1 (quoting plaintiffs lawyers, who stated that while an individual consumer case
is not financially attractive because so little money is involved, a class action is).
297. See Roderer, supra note 214, at 855.
298. See SHELDON & CARTER, supra note 297, at 47-111, 465-80 (discussing
the scope of state consumer statutes and preconditions to bringing private
actions); Donna S. Shapiro, The Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, 9 GA. ST. U. L.
REv. 453 (1993) (discussing the restrictions courts have imposed upon con-
sumer actions under Georgia's UDAP statute).
299. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102 § 524(a), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
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than the Modernization Act. 00 Twenty-five states and some
municipalities have been considering privacy legislation which
would provide greater protection than that afforded by the Mod-
ernization Act."0' State laws requiring the more consumer-
friendly opt-in rather than the Modernization Act's opt-out are a
principal issue attracting attention.0 2 If these bills are enacted,
financial institutions operating in many states would have to com-
ply with many different state privacy laws.303 The Comptroller of
the Currency urged banks to try to halt this trend by voluntarily
providing more protection than required by the Modernization
Act in order to show that new state law is unnecessary.3 0 4
C. Congressional Privacy Bills
It is instructive to compare the Modernization Act with other
privacy bills which were before the first session of the 106th Con-
gress in order to further evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of
the Modernization Act. Several bills would regulate Internet
transactions. They would cover some of the same areas as the
Modernization Act which applies both to Internet and traditional
modes of conducting business with financial institutions. At the
same time, they would have a broader scope than the Moderniza-
tion Act because they would apply to all types of companies
doing business on the Internet, not just financial institutions.
Consumers may be confused about the scope of the Mod-
ernization Act, incorrectly believing it covers all electronic com-
merce. The enactment of new privacy legislation could lessen
that confusion. Financial institutions increasingly are offering
online banking services. Many traditional banks offer such serv-
ices, 30 5 and several exclusively Internet banks have been estab-
300. See id. § 524(b).
301. See Dean Anason, Consumer Privacy Laws May be Set to Spread Like Wild
Fire in States, AM. BANKER, Dec. 6, 1999, at 1, 6 (reporting on activities in states
and municipalities). States were actively considering bills even before enact-
ment of the federal law. See Martha Kessler, Privacy Bill Could Have Sweeping
Impact on Banking Industry, State Bankers Warn, BANKING REP. (BNA), Aug. 2,
1999, at 168 (describing Massachusetts privacy bill); Laura Mahoney, California
Senators Eye State Law Protecting Privacy of Bank Customers, BANKING REp. (BNA),
July 19, 1999, at 88 (describing testimony on bill to regulate banks' sale of per-
sonal information to telemarketers); Gerald Silverman, Package of Privacy Bills
Approved by New York State Assembly, BANKING REP. (BNA), June 7, 1999, at 10, 13
(describing New York privacy bills).
302. See Anason, supra note 302, at 6.
303. See Fickenscher, supra note 270 (quoting Christine Varney, an attor-
ney, as saying "The worse scenario is 50 different privacy regimes.").
304. See Anason, supra note 302, at 6.
305. See, e.g., Citibank, Online Financial Solutions (visited Feb. 2, 2000)
<http://www.citibank.com>.
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lished.50 6 Surveys have indicated that consumers are very
concerned about their privacy when dealing with financial insti-
tutions, and worried about invasions of their privacy when doing
business on the Internet."°7 The Modernization Act requires
financial institutions to have a privacy policy and to disclose that
policy to consumers.30 8 It requires notice of the bank's practices
regarding disclosure of nonpublic personal information to third
parties.3 09 Presumably, as a result of these privacy measures, con-
sumers will become less worried about possible privacy intrusions
and will do more banking online. In addition, they may engage
in other types of business as well, wrongly believing the full pano-
ply of privacy rights contained in the Modernization Act applies
to every type of Internet transaction.
The Modernization Act permits banks, insurance companies
and brokerage firms to merge. As described above, 310 the Mod-
ernization Act provides far less privacy protection in regard to
information sharing among these affiliates. Consumers, how-
ever, may not realize the protection they lose when they do busi-
ness with the insurance company or brokerage firm that is
affiliated with their bank as opposed to an independent insur-
ance company or brokerage, and will increase their online busi-
ness with these companies as well. The fact that the
Modernization Act applies, not only to banking, but to the sale of
insurance and securities, may confuse consumers into believing
that the Modernization Act's coverage is broader than it actually
is. They may believe the Modernization Act covers all types of
transactions, including the sale of goods and services on the
Web. The likelihood of this confusion is probably increased by
the very fact that many Web sellers voluntarily post privacy poli-
cies and official-looking privacy seals on their sites."' Consum-
ers may think Web sellers do this in compliance with some legal
requirement. Because there is no law establishing minimum
requirements, however, Web sellers' voluntary privacy policy may
306. See, e.g., Security First Network Bank (visited Oct. 31, 1999) <http://
www.sfnb.com>.
307. See Fickenscher, supra note 270, at 11 (reporting on a Louis Harris
survey in which consumers said they did not trust companies that gather infor-
mation online).
308. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102 § 503(a), 113 Star. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
309. See id. § 502(a).
310. See supra text accompanying notes 282-288.
311. See, e.g., Land's End, Home Page (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://
www.landsend.com/cd/frontdoor>.
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not offer any meaningful protection, 312 and there may not be any
way to enforce the posted policy. Consumer misunderstanding
of the extent to which the law protects their privacy will be less-
ened by the enactment of new statutes which broaden that pro-
tection to areas not covered by the Modernization Act.
A major loophole in the Modernization Act is its exclusion
of affiliates from the third party notice and opt-out.313 House
Bill 1339 would close that loophole by imposing notice require-
ments which apply to affiliates as well as other third parties. 14
The bill offers greater protection to consumers than the Modern-
ization Act by providing for an opt-in procedure rather than the
Modernization Act's opt-out.315 Finally, whereas the Moderniza-
tion Act requires disclosure of an institution's policies and prac-
tices in regard to disclosing personal information at the time the
customer relationship is established and annually thereafter, 16
this bill requires the institution to inform its customers "when-
ever ... financial information is being collected that pertains to
such customers.
3 17
Senate Bill 809, the Online Privacy Protection Act of 1999,
applies to operators of Web sites and online services. It requires
the FTC to promulgate regulations which would, inter alia,
require covered businesses to give consumers who have provided
personal information to the business "a description of the spe-
cific types of personal information collected by that operator that
was sold or transferred to an external company" upon the con-
sumer's request for that information. 1 ' This goes beyond the
Modernization Act which requires only a disclosure of the cate-
gories of persons to whom information may be disclosed and
312. See Guernsey, supra note 167, at 1, available in 1999 WL 2882191
(stating that the posting of a seal on a site does not mean the Web merchant
displaying the seal will not sell your personal information to others).
313. See supra text accompanying notes 274-276.
314. See H.R. 1339 § 2, 106th Cong. (1999). In May, 2000, President Clin-
ton announced that he will introduce legislation extending the opt-out to
affiliates.
315. See id. § 2(a) ( An institution would not be permitted to share infor-
mation except "upon the affirmative written request, or with the affirmative
written consent, of the customer to whom the information pertains").
316. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102 § 503, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
317. H.R. 1339 § 2.
318. S. 809 § 2(b) (1) (B) (i), 106th Cong. (1999). "Personal information"
is defined to include the consumer's first and last name, her home and other
physical address, e-mail address, social security number, telephone number, any
other identifier that the FTC determines identifies an individual, or informa-
tion "that is maintained with, or can be searched or retrieved by means of, data
described" in the above five categories. Id. § 8(8).
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types of information collected.319 In addition under Senate Bill
809, the operator must provide the consumer with a reasonable
means "to obtain the personal information."320 This is an impor-
tant provision because it provides an ingredient regarded by
many as essential to consumer privacy, that is, access to informa-
tion about the consumer. The Modernization Act does not grant
consumers the right to access.321
Finally, Senate Bill 809 contains an interesting provision
acknowledging the role which self-regulation could play. Repre-
sentatives of the marketing and online industries, as well as many
others, are encouraged to draft their own guidelines. If they are
approved by the FTC, a person who complies with them would
be deemed in compliance with the regulations issued by the
FTC. 322
Whereas Senate Bill 809 grants consumers the right of
access, House Bill 313, the Consumer Internet Privacy Protection
Act takes the next crucial step by also giving the consumer the
right to correct any error in the information maintained by the
computer services covered by the bill. 323 The Modernization Act,
by not granting the consumer access to her information, obvi-
ously also does not provide a right to correct the institution's
information about the consumer. 32
4
The bill also contains two other important provisions. First,
it improves on Senate Bill 809 by not only granting access, but
also providing that the company cannot charge a fee for making
the requested information available. This may be seen as an
acknowledgment that the consumer has some type of legal inter-
est in information about herself, and that it would be unfair to
charge the consumer a fee for that information. Finally, the bill
prohibits disclosure of personal information unless the con-
sumer supplies "prior informed written consent. '325 The Mod-
319. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act §§ 503(b) (1) (A),
503 (b) (2).
320. S. 809 § 2(1)(B)(ii). There are exceptions when this requirement
does not apply. See id. § 2 (b)(2)(3).
321. Both the Guidelines and the Directive provide consumers with
access to their information. Guidelines, supra note 184; Directive, supra note
185, at art. 12.
322. SeeS. 809 §3.
323. See H.R. 313 § 2 (C)(1)(C), 106th Cong. (1999). The bill covers
"interactive computer services" defined as "any information service that pro-
vides computer access to multiple users via modem to the Internet." Id. §4(1).
324. Both the Guidelines and the Directive permit the consumer to cor-
rect inaccurate and incomplete information. Guidelines, supra note 184; Direc-
tive, supra note 185, at art. 12(c).
325. H.R. 313 § 2.
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ernization Act permits disclosure to third parties "with the
consent or at the direction of the consumer. 3 26 The bill con-
tains much stronger language to protect the consumer by requir-
ing that the consent be in writing and be "informed." Moreover,
the bill provides that where the consumer has given her consent,
she can revoke it at any time.327 Presumably, this is also true
under the Modernization Act, but it does not say this explicitly.
House Bill 3320 was drafted in order to expand the coverage
of the Modernization Act by amending provisions of that Act.
32 s
The bill would strengthen a consumer's privacy protection in sev-
eral significant respects. In regard to the notices triggered by an
institution's sharing information with others, the bill changes the
opt-out notice to an opt-in notice, and extends its coverage to
affiliates.3 29 The Modernization Act provides consumers with
protection in regard to disclosure of account number informa-
tion to nonaffiliated third parties; the bill would extend protec-
tion in regard to disclosures to affiliates as well. 33" The bill would
apply to nonfinancial products331 as well as the financial prod-
ucts or services covered by the Modernization Act. Whereas the
Modernization Act applies only to the disclosure of financial
information, 3 2 the bill applies both to disclosure of the informa-
tion and making "unrelated use" of the information. 333 The
institution can share information with others if the consumer
affirmatively consents, but the bill also explicitly recognizes the
consumer's right to withdraw that consent.334 The institution is
prohibited from denying a consumer any financial product or
service if the consumer refuses to consent.3 35 The exceptions
326. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
112 § 502(e) (2), 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
327. See H.R. 313 § 2(a)(2).
328. The tide of House Bill 3320 is, "To amend the privacy provisions of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act." H.R. 3320, 106th Cong. (1999).
329. See id. § 502(b).
330. See id. § 502(d). As in the Modernization Act, the bill's restrictions
on account numbers applies to prohibiting disclosure when the information is
to be used for telemarketing, direct mail marketing, or electronic mail. It adds
the new category of "other electronic means." Id.
331. See id. § 502(b)(2)(B). The Modernization Act applies to financial
products or services.
332. The provisions on the disclosure of privacy policy and opt-out apply
to nonpublic personal information. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modern-
ization Act §§ 502(a), 503(a). The Modernization Act defines nonpublic infor-
mation to mean financial information. See id. § 509(4) (a).
333. See H.R. 3320 § 502(a).
334. See id. § 502(b)(1)(B).
335. See id. § 502(b) (3).
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under the bill are more limited than under the Modernization
Act.
336
An important gap in the Modernization Act is its failure to
provide consumers with access to information and the opportu-
nity to correct inaccuracies in it. The bill grants consumers the
right to examine all nonpublic personal information that has
been disclosed to any person or entity besides an employee or
agent of the institution.33 7 Furthermore, the consumer can dis-
pute the accuracy of that information.
338
In regard to the institution's requirement to notify custom-
ers of its privacy practices and policies, the bill would add several
important requirements. In addition to disclosing its policies
about sharing information with others, the institution also must
disclose its policies about how it makes unrelated uses of that
information, 3 3 including who is permitted to make unrelated
uses of the information. 4 ° The institution must inform consum-
ers of their right to examine the institution's nonpublic personal
information about them,3 41 and its practices and policies regard-
ing the consumer's ability to examine the information and dis-
pute its accuracy. 342 The enforcement agencies are required to
design forms for the required notice of an institution's privacy
practices and policies.343 The forms must be designed so that a
consumer can compare the practices and policies of one institu-
tion to another. Finally, the enforcement agencies are instructed
to prescribe rules which will prohibit unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in connection with an institution's disclosure of non-
public personal information and its making unrelated uses of
that information.
344
House Bill 3320 strengthens the privacy protection provi-
sions of the Modernization Act in many significant ways. Never-
theless, privacy advocates may still find it inadequate. First, there
is no private right of action, so enforcement is subject to the
whims, political considerations, priorities, and resource limita-
tions of the agencies with enforcement authority. Second, like
the Modernization Act, only financial institutions are within its
336. For example, there is no exception for private label credit card pro-
grams. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act § 502(e) (1) (B).
337. See H.R. 3320 § 502(c)(1)(A), 106th Congress (1999).
338. See id. § 502(c)(1)(B).
339. See id. § 503(a)(2).
340. See id. § 503(a) (2) (A).
341. See id. § 503(a) (5).
342. See id. § 503(a) (4).
343. See id. § 503(b).
344. See id. § 503(a).
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scope. Matters of less importance also may cause concern.
Although the bill would guarantee consumers access to the insti-
tution's nonpublic information about them, unlike House Bill
313,"' there is no prohibition against the institution charging a
fee to discourage consumers from exercising their access rights.
The bill permits consumers to dispute the accuracy of an institu-
tion's information. This should be expanded to allow the con-
sumer to dispute the completeness of the information as well.346
Finally, the bill would expand disclosures to include an institu-
tion making unrelated uses of personal information, but the bill
does not define that term.
This examination of bills in Congress enables one to identify
major weaknesses in the Modernization Act's protection of con-
sumers' privacy. The Modernization Act is an important substan-
tive and symbolic step forward. The pending legislation indicates
ways in which the law needs to be improved by filling major gaps
in the Modernization Act. The bills, however, are deficient in
granting rights but providing no remedy for those directly
injured by violation of those rights. This should be rectified by
adding a private right of action.
CONCLUSION
1999 was a momentous year for privacy protection. Despite
the lack of an aggressive response from federal agencies,347 the
actions of the Minnesota Attorney General and Congress
resulted in significant legal protection for consumers. Perhaps as
important, those actions have encouraged others to act. In the
aftermath of the Minnesota case, attorneys general from more
than thirty states began to investigate whether banks were violat-
ing federal or state law in their information sharing practices.348
Concerned with the limits in the Modernization Act's protection,
345. See supra text accompanying note 328.
346. See Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (1998)
(permitting consumer to dispute the "completeness or accuracy of any item of
information" in the consumer's file).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 134, 148. Agencies have contin-
ued to be involved in considering privacy issues since enactment of the Modern-
ization Act. See FTC, Online Privacy Committee Members Named (visited Jan 27,
2000) <http://ftc.gov/opa/2000/01/asrev.htm> (FTC named members of a
committee to advise the FTC on the costs and benefits of implementing fair
information practices of access and security online on January 21, 2000).
348. See R. Christian Bruce, Working Group of Attorneys General Investigating
Banks' Privacy Practices, 68 U.S.L.W. 2199, Oct. 12, 1999. See also Michael Gor-
mley, Bank, Internet Firm Agree to Curbs, Assoc. PREss, Jan. 25, 2000, available in
2000 WL 9750970 (reporting that New York's Attorney General reached a set-
tlement with Chase Manhattan in which the bank agreed to stop sharing per-
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bills were submitted to Congress 349 and state legislatures350 to
provide greater protection.
In the coming years of this new millennium, we will see how
far state legislatures and Congress are willing to go to ensure con-
sumers have adequate privacy protection. The study mandated
by the Modernization Act351 may provide an important impetus
for new legislation, or may put a damper on new efforts. If Con-
gress refuses to act, the states may push forward on their own.
This may take the form of new legislation or further lawsuits
brought by state attorneys general. Consumers may seek to take
advantage of these legislative developments to bring lawsuits. As
discussed in this article, if legislators are serious about promoting
privacy protection, they will enact legislation granting consumers
a private right of action so they can enforce their privacy rights.
Meanwhile, companies may voluntarily guarantee additional pro-
tection in order to bolster consumer confidence and stave off
further legislation.
While the above is occurring, there will be new technologi-
cal developments. 352 Some will improve industry's and consum-
ers' ability to protect privacy.353  Others will provide
opportunities for further invasions of privacy. Electronic com-
merce will undoubtedly increase, posing new types of invasions
through that medium.3 4 The Modernization Act will encourage
companies to enter into new types of business combinations with
significant implications for privacy as affiliates share financial,
health, and investment information about their customers.
Other combinations not involving financial institutions also pose
sonal information with an e-mail marketing company in violation of the bank's
privacy policy).
349. See supra text accompanying notes 314-47.
350. See supra text accompanying note 301.
351. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No.
106-102 § 508, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801).
352. See, e.g., Chris Farnsworth, Sell Phones Technology: BuyNow.com Will Use
the Internet to Turn Cell Phones Into Buying Devices, ORANGE COUN REG., Jan. 25,
2000, at C1 (describing a new product in which consumers using Web-enabled
cell phones will be able to purchase goods from those phones).
353. The World Wide Web Consortium has developed a Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences which enables users to specify their privacy preferences so that
their computer knows what sites provide the level of privacy the consumer
desires. See World Wide Web Consortium, Platform for Privacy Preferences (visited
Oct. 4, 1999) <http://www.w3.org/P3P>.
354. See, e.g., Mark Clothier, Software to Let Companies See Wo Visits Sites,
ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 2, 2000, at D6 (reporting on a new product allowing
companies to track the conduct of consumers who visit their Web sites).
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a privacy threat to consumers.3 55 These new developments may
be accompanied by privacy invasions which are so vast in scope
or injurious to those affected that there will be demands for new
laws.356 Overreaction by legislators and government enforcers of
the law could impede the flow of information which businesses
need in order to efficiently market and sell goods and services.
Failure to act could expose consumers to great harm which bal-
anced new legislation and responsible enforcement actions
would have prevented. These are the public policy choices which
will always confront legislators and enforcement agencies.
Change will continue as technology improves and businesses
develop new products and marketing methods.357 This change
will present new opportunities to erode consumer privacy. As
long as there is change, there can be no magic legal bullet which
will halt this endless cycle which requires constant reevaluation
of the need for new legal initiatives. But there are things which
can be done to ameliorate the present state of affairs. This arti-
cle has pointed out the deficiencies in our present laws and the
restrictions under which those who enforce those laws must oper-
ate. Moreover, the article has suggested how our laws should be
improved in the immediate future to provide the necessary level
of privacy protection.
355. See generally Deborah Kong, E-tail Troubles Cloud Future of Consumer
Data, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, at 10 (quoting Marcelo Halpern, an attorney
specializing in e-commerce, as saying, "I think there will eventually be acquisi-
tions that are based on consumer data, where the primary asset that's being
bought is the consumer data.... Consumer data right now is the currency of e-
commerce in a lot of ways."); Steven Levy, The Two Big Bets, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 24,
2000, at 38, 42 (reporting that the announced merger of AOL and Time
Warner has raised fears about their combined database with information about
"everything from your reading habits to your day-trading logs"); .
356. Given the sensitivity of health and medical information, privacy inva-
sions involving those types of data may provide the trigger for a demand for far
stronger and more comprehensive laws. SeeJeri Clausing, Health Web Sites Fail to
Keep Personal Data Private, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2000, at A19 (reporting
on a study by the California Health Care Foundation that found that 19 of the
21 surveyed health sites had privacy policies, but most do not follow their
policies).
357. Marketing may involve structuring transactions in new ways in which
consumers voluntarily surrender their privacy in order to gain a benefit. See,
e.g., Newest Net Gimmick: Cash for Reading E-mai4 ATLANTAJ.-CONsT., Feb. 2, 2000,
at DI (describing company that pays consumers $30 per month if the consumer
surfs for 50 hours each month, provides the company with personal informa-
tion, and agrees to allow the company to monitor the consumer's surfing).
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